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Charles W. Tyler†
In most courts, a statement in an opinion is a holding only if it was necessary
for the outcome of the case. Several state courts and one federal court of appeals,
however, have a much broader definition of a holding, which this Article calls the
“adjudicative model.” The adjudicative model defines a holding as any ruling expressly resolving an issue that was part of the case.
This Article offers the first empirical and normative assessment of the adjudicative model. It describes an empirical case study of the Ninth Circuit and finds
that, after adopting the adjudicative model, that court was more likely to follow its
precedent in cases involving disputes about the holding/dictum distinction. To the
extent this finding can be generalized to other courts using the adjudicative model,
it promotes consistency in a court’s stated rules of law and hastens the development
of case law. But the adjudicative model also creates an incentive for judges to overreach, perhaps reducing the overall quality of a court’s decisions and giving greater
influence to its outliers. Because these values are in tension, a court’s definition of a
holding should ultimately depend on its particular institutional features—such as
its size, decision-making processes, and the nature of its docket—which can amplify
or diminish the adjudicative model’s relative costs and benefits.
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INTRODUCTION
The decisions of common law courts are authoritative in future cases.1 They are authoritative, however, only with regard to
the issues raised in the case. The distinction between holdings
(the law a case establishes) and dicta (everything else it says) is
therefore critical for determining the content of the law.2 So how
should courts distinguish between holdings and dicta?
In most jurisdictions, a court’s prior statement of law is a
holding only if it was necessary for the outcome of the prior case.
Unnecessary statements are dicta and needn’t be followed.3 Call
1
See H.L.A. Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory 243, 261–66 (Oxford
1982); Jeremy Waldron, Stare Decisis and the Rule of Law: A Layered Approach, 111 Mich
L Rev 1, 7 (2012); Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 Va L Rev 1931, 1943
(2008); Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S Cal L Rev 1, 3 (1989). This Article
focuses primarily on a court’s obligation to follow its own decisions (horizontal precedent),
rather than the decisions of a higher court (vertical precedent). See Michael Abramowicz
and Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 Stan L Rev 953, 957 (2005) (explaining the
distinction).
2
In the sense I intend here, a case “establishes law” whenever it resolves an issue
that hasn’t previously been resolved. This definition is intentionally broad, and it includes
both decisions that create legal rules in traditional common law fashion and decisions that
merely interpret an enacted text.
3
See Black’s Law Dictionary 569 (West 11th ed 2019) (defining “obiter dictum” as a
“judicial comment . . . that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore not
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this the “necessity model” of precedent. The necessity model is a
natural extension of the view that a court’s primary function is
dispute resolution, and its power to declare the law is merely a
byproduct of that function.4
One problem for the necessity model is that it’s highly contestable what “necessary” means. The Supreme Court, for instance, has in recent years suggested that a case’s holding is
(i) the proposition that the outcome follows from the facts of the
case;5 (ii) the principal rationale for the outcome;6 (iii) any but-for
condition for the outcome;7 and (iv) any proposition that was on
the court’s analytical route to the outcome.8 And the Supreme
Court isn’t unique; many courts are wildly inconsistent in how
they go about determining the holdings of cases. Little wonder
that the holding/dictum distinction’s malleability is a frequent
trope in academic writing skeptical of the power of legal doctrine
to constrain judges.9

precedential”). See also Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Nature of the Common Law 52 (Harvard 1988); Paul J. Watford, Richard C. Chen, and Marco Basile, Book Review, Crafting
Precedent, 131 Harv L Rev 543, 576 (2017); Ryan C. Williams, Questioning Marks: Plurality Decisions and Precedential Constraint, 69 Stan L Rev 795, 826 (2017); Pierre N. Leval,
Judging Under the Constitution: Dicta About Dicta, 81 NYU L Rev 1249, 1256 (2006);
Abramowicz and Stearns, 57 Stan L Rev at 1065–66 (cited in note 1); Judith M. Stinson,
Why Dicta Becomes Holding and Why It Matters, 76 Brooklyn L Rev 219, 223 (2010);
Shawn J. Bayern, Case Interpretation, 36 Fla St U L Rev 125, 129 (2009); Randy Beck,
Transtemporal Separation of Powers in the Law of Precedent, 87 Notre Dame L Rev 1405,
1429 (2012); Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
Colum L Rev 723, 764–65 (1988); James Hardisty, Reflections on Stare Decisis, 55 Ind L J
41, 57–58 (1979).
4
For more on the “dispute resolution model” of the judicial role, see Richard H. Fallon Jr, John F. Manning, Daniel J Meltzer, and David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler’s The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 73–76 (Foundation 7th ed 2015). For criticisms of
the dispute-resolution model, see Abram Chayes, Foreword: Public Law Litigation and the
Burger Court, 96 Harv L Rev 4, 51 (1982); Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation, 89 Harv L Rev 1281, 1288–1302 (1976); Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The
Forms of Justice, 93 Harv L Rev 1, 17–29 (1979); Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42
Stan L Rev 227, 281–82 (1990); Girardeau A. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U Pa L Rev
585, 585, 618–32 (1983); Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example
of Mootness, 105 Harv L Rev 603, 626–31 (1992).
5
See Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654, 690–91 (1988); Part I.A.
6
See American Express Co v Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 US 228, 235–36 & n 2
(2013); Part I.B.
7
See United States v Windsor, 570 US 744, 758–59 (2013); Part I.C.
8
See National Federation of Independent Business v Sebelius, 567 US 519, 548–58
(2012) (Roberts writing only for himself in this portion of the opinion); Part I.D.
9
See, for example, Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind 159 (Brentano’s 1930);
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments,
15 Cardozo L Rev 43, 63–64 (1993); Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90 Minn L Rev 1173, 1187 (2006); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U Pa L
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The necessity model is often assumed to be a fixed point in
common law adjudication. But it’s not. An entirely different model
of precedent prevails in the state courts of Arizona, Illinois, Maryland, and Minnesota as well as in the US Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit. In these jurisdictions, a holding is any ruling
expressly resolving an issue that was part of the case.10 Courts in
these jurisdictions eschew a narrow focus on the actual outcome,
looking instead to every issue that could have affected a possible
outcome of the case. Call this the “adjudicative model” because
the key question is whether an issue has been ruled on—that is,
adjudicated—not whether that ruling was necessary. Unlike the
necessity model, the adjudicative model embraces the courts’ lawdeclaration function, rather than viewing it as a regrettable side
effect of dispute resolution.11
To see how the two models differ in operation, consider the
Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in National Labor Relations
Board v Noel Canning.12 That case concerned whether the Constitution’s Recess Appointments Clause allows the president to appoint federal officers during a three-day, intrasession recess of the
Senate to positions that were vacant before the recess began.13
The Court first ruled that the president may appoint officers during intrasession recesses and fill positions that were vacant before the recess began.14 The Court ultimately concluded, however,
that the president may not appoint officers during recesses as
Rev 1997, 2004–05 (1994); Monaghan, 88 Colum L Rev at 743 (cited in note 3); Richard H.
Fallon Jr, Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 Harv L Rev 54, 124–25 (1997); William N. Eskridge Jr, Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Georgetown L J 1361, 1370 (1988);
Michael Sean Quinn, Argument and Authority in Common Law Advocacy and Adjudication:
An Irreducible Pluralism of Principles, 74 Chi Kent L Rev 655, 713 (1999).
10 See Part II. The one caveat involves cases where a court finds that it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. A court without jurisdiction may not establish binding law, save for
law pertaining to jurisdiction itself. See River Park Inc v City of Highland Park, 703 NE2d
883, 891 (Ill 1998) (“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.
Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.”), quoting
Steel Co v Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 US 83, 94 (1998).
11 See Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: A Theory of Precedent 70–91 (Cambridge
2017) (noting that a broader conception of precedent gives greater lawmaking power to
courts of first impression); Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of Precedent, 113 Mich L Rev 179,
183 (2014) (same); Beck, 87 Notre Dame L Rev at 1417–18 (cited in note 3) (discussing the
challenges involved with the “unnecessary resolution of legal issues” under the necessity
model).
12 573 US 513 (2014).
13 Id at 519.
14 Id at 526–38 (conclusion on intrasession recesses); id at 538–49 (conclusion on prerecess vacancies).
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short as three days.15 Were the Court’s first two rulings holdings?
The necessity model would say “no” because they were unnecessary for the outcome. But the adjudicative model would say “yes”
because each ruling could have affected a possible outcome of the
case, even though neither affected the actual outcome.
The adjudicative model raises several empirical and normative questions, which this Article attempts to answer over the
course of five Parts. Using a series of recent Supreme Court decisions, Part I illustrates the various, often inconsistent, ways that
federal courts have parsed the necessity model. Part II explains
the jurisprudence of the states that use the adjudicative model
and then describes the Ninth Circuit’s decision to adopt that
model in a fascinating series of cases in the early 2000s.
Using a multi-method approach, Part III analyzes whether
and how the behavior of judges can be expected to change after a
court adopts the adjudicative model. I performed a quantitative
analysis on the Ninth Circuit’s treatment of its own precedent before and after it adopted the adjudicative model.16 And I supplemented that analysis with anonymous interviews of Ninth Circuit
judges.17 The quantitative analysis suggests that, after adopting
the adjudicative model, the Ninth Circuit was more likely to follow its own precedent in cases involving disputes about the
holding/dictum distinction.18
Part IV considers the adjudicative model’s normative implications for the federal appellate courts. Although a complete normative assessment of the adjudicative model is beyond the scope
of this Article, I identify two considerations that are important for

15

Id at 557.
For a description of my quantitative methodology, see Part III.A.
17 For a description of the interviews, see note 98.
18 This Article thus contributes to a growing literature on the potentially stabilizing
effects of doctrinal frameworks. See generally Fallon, 111 Harv L Rev 54 (cited in note 9);
Michael A. Bailey and Forrest Maltzman, Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law
and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 102 Am Polit Sci Rev 369 (2008);
Stefanie A. Lindquist and David E. Klein, The Influence of Jurisprudential Considerations
on Supreme Court Decisionmaking: A Study of Conflict Cases, 40 L & Society Rev 135
(2006); Mark J. Richards and Herbert M. Kritzer, Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme
Court Decision Making, 96 Am Polit Sci Rev 305 (2002); Paul J. Wahlbeck, The Life of the
Law: Judicial Politics and Legal Change, 59 J Polit 778 (1997); Howard Gillman, Book
Review, What’s Law Got To Do With It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the “Legal Model” of
Judicial Decision Making, 26 L & Soc Inquiry 465 (2001); Abbe R. Gluck, The States as
Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified
Textualism, 119 Yale L J 1750 (2010); Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis
Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 Georgetown L J 1863 (2008).
16
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such an assessment. On one hand, the adjudicative model promotes the law’s clarity by providing a clear framework for identifying the holdings of cases and by expanding the set of propositions that qualify as binding law. On the other hand, the model
gives judges an incentive to reach out to resolve issues more
quickly, which may diminish the quality of individual legal rules
and increase the influence of a court’s outliers. Part IV concludes
by explaining that these costs and benefits are amplified by a
court’s particular institutional features, such as its size, decisionmaking processes, and the nature of its docket.
Part V argues that the adjudicative model doesn’t violate Article III of the Constitution. Article III allows federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over, and establish law concerning, any issue
that’s part of a properly brought case, even where an issue turns
out not to have been necessary for the outcome. In this respect,
Article III’s limitations on a court’s power to resolve legal issues
are more flexible than some scholars have thought.19
Scholarly and judicial interest in the law of stare decisis is
experiencing a resurgence. In 2019, the Supreme Court overruled
two decades-old precedents20 and considered overruling a third,21
prompting Justice Stephen Breyer to wonder “which cases the
Court will overrule next.”22 That criticism was framed in terms of
precedent’s strength—the deference a court should give to propositions understood to be precedential. But respect for precedent is
also about scope—which propositions count as binding precedent
in the first place. This is an opportune time to reconsider that
question.
I. THE MANY FACES OF THE NECESSITY MODEL
The necessity model is ubiquitous; one finds it in countless
federal appellate decisions.23 Its ubiquity, however, masks a great

19

See Part V.B.
See Franchise Tax Board of California v Hyatt, 139 S Ct 1485, 1492 (2019), overruling Nevada v Hall, 440 US 410 (1979); Knick v Township of Scott, Pennsylvania, 139 S
Ct 2162, 2179 (2019), overruling Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v
Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 US 172 (1985).
21 See Kisor v Wilkie, 139 S Ct 2400, 2413–23 (2019) (declining to disapprove of Auer
v Robbins, 519 US 452 (1997)).
22 Hyatt, 139 S Ct at 1506 (Breyer dissenting).
23 See, for example, Seminole Tribe of Florida v Florida, 517 US 44, 67 (1996) (stating
that “we are bound” by “those portions of the opinion necessary to th[e] result”); Tyler v
Cain, 533 US 656, 663 n 4 (2001) (affirming the analysis in Seminole Tribe that binding
precedent includes the final disposition and “the preceding determinations necessary to
20
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deal of variety in how it has been applied. Using a series of Supreme Court cases, this Part illustrates that variety and argues
that it undermines the rule-of-law values that precedent is intended to serve.
A. Facts Plus Outcome
One way of understanding the necessity model is that a holding is the proposition that the outcome of a case legally follows
from its facts.24 If the facts of the case were X and Y, and the outcome was Z, then the holding is the proposition that “if X and Y,
then Z.”25 On this view, more abstract propositions aren’t necessary for reaching the outcome because they can always be reframed at a lower level of generality.
To illustrate, consider the hoary example of the statute prohibiting vehicles in the park.26 Suppose, in case 1, a court vacates
that result”) (emphasis in original); Wright v Spaulding, 939 F3d 695, 697 (6th Cir 2019)
(noting that “the holdings that bind future courts” are “the legal rules” that are “essential
to” resolving disputes); In re Friedman’s Inc, 738 F3d 547, 552 (3d Cir 2013) (explaining
that “[i]f a determination by our Court is not necessary to our ultimate holding, it properly
is classified as dictum”) (quotation marks omitted); Perez v Mountaire Farms, Inc, 650 F3d
350, 373 (4th Cir 2011) (noting that a statement was “merely dicta” because it was “not
necessary to the Court’s resolution of the factual issue that was the basis of its holding”);
Baraket v Holder, 632 F3d 56, 59 (2d Cir 2011) (stating that “it is not substantive discussion of a question or lack thereof that distinguishes holding from dictum, but rather
whether resolution of the question is necessary for the decision of the case”); Ackerson v
Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F3d 196, 205 (5th Cir 2009) (explaining that “the court’s statements . . . were unnecessary . . . and constitute nonbinding dicta”); Arcam Pharmaceutical
Corp v Faria, 513 F3d 1, 3 (1st Cir 2007) (explaining that “[t]he result, along with those
portions of the opinion necessary to the result, are binding, whereas dicta is not”).
24 See, for example, Federal Election Commission v Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc, 551
US 449, 465–67 (2007) (narrowly construing the rationale of McConnell v Federal Election
Commission, 540 US 93 (2003), based on the evidentiary record); United States v Vanover,
630 F3d 1108, 1120–21 (8th Cir 2011); id at 1123–24 (Riley concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (characterizing the majority opinion as restricting prior rulings
through factual examination); Getsy v Mitchell, 456 F3d 575, 591 (6th Cir 2006); Council
on American Islamic Relations v Ballenger, 444 F3d 659, 666 (DC Cir 2006).
25 For academic proponents of the facts-plus-outcome approach, see Edward H. Levi,
An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 2 (Chicago 1949); Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining
the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 Yale L J 161, 168–69 (1930); Ruggero J. Aldisert, Precedent: What It Is and What It Isn’t; When Do We Kiss It and When Do We Kill It?, 17 Pepperdine L Rev 605, 631 (1990). Inverting this approach, Professor Adam N. Steinman has
argued that the express rules stated by an earlier court should be binding, see Adam N.
Steinman, Case Law, 97 BU L Rev 1947, 1977–84 (2017), but the proposition that the
outcome follows from the facts should not be, see Adam N. Steinman, To Say What the
Law Is: Rules, Results, and the Dangers of Inferential Stare Decisis, 99 Va L Rev 1737,
1760–66 (2013).
26 See, of course, H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
Harv L Rev 593, 606–15 (1958).
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a defendant’s conviction for riding her tricycle in the park, concluding that human-powered objects aren’t “vehicles” under the
statute. On the facts-plus-outcome approach, a court in case 2
may uphold a bicycle rider’s conviction, even though a bicycle is a
human-powered object. The court respects the holding of case 1
so long as it can supply a rationale for deciding against the bicycle
rider that would justify the outcome in the earlier case.27 (The
court may conclude, say, that tricycles fall outside of what the
legislature was trying to prohibit because they reach lower maximum speeds than bicycles.)
A real-world example is the Supreme Court’s 1988 decision
in Morrison v Olson,28 which forced the Court to confront its 1935
decision in Humphrey’s Executor v United States.29 In the earlier
case, the estate of a former commissioner of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) sought back pay because his dismissal by
President Franklin Roosevelt hadn’t complied with a federal statute limiting the reasons for which FTC commissioners could be
dismissed.30 The Court concluded that limitations on the president’s authority to remove FTC commissioners were constitutional because the commissioners exercised “quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative” duties, rather than “purely executive” authority.31
Morrison involved a similar set of questions. It presented a
constitutional challenge to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978,
which allowed the appointment of an independent counsel that
only the attorney general could dismiss for reasons listed in the
statute.32 In light of Humphrey’s Executor, many expected the
challenge to succeed; after all, the Act limited the president’s authority to remove an officer exercising purely executive authority.33 The Court, however, eschewed the rationale of Humphrey’s
Executor.34 “[T]he real question,” the Court wrote, “is whether the
27 Scholars have criticized the facts-plus-outcome approach for allowing courts to
“evade precedents that cannot fairly be distinguished.” Dorf, 142 U Pa L Rev at 1999 (cited
in note 9). See also Peter J. Smith, The Marshall Court and the Originalist’s Dilemma, 90
Minn L Rev 612, 639 (2006); Andrew C. Michaels, The Holding-Dictum Spectrum, 70 Ark
L Rev 661, 674–75 (2017).
28 487 US 654 (1988).
29 295 US 602 (1935).
30 Id at 618.
31 Id at 618–28.
32 Morrison, 487 US at 663, citing 28 USC § 596(a)(l).
33 See id at 662.
34 Id at 689 (“[T]he determination of whether the Constitution allows Congress to
impose a ‘good cause’–type restriction on the President’s power to remove an official cannot
be made to turn on whether or not that official is classified as ‘purely executive.’”).
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removal restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the
President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty.”35 And since
the Court concluded that the independent counsel provisions
didn’t do so, the challenge failed. Importantly, in the Court’s view,
Humphrey’s Executor was still good law because nothing said in
Morrison would have required Humphrey’s Executor to come out
the other way.36
B. Rationale for the Outcome
A second take on the necessity model is that the holding is
the rationale—the court’s primary reason for the outcome.37 A single court may establish a prospective legal rule, but once it has
said enough to explain the outcome, its authority to establish law
is at an end.38 The holding of the tricycle-in-the-park case, for instance, would include the proposition that human-powered objects aren’t “vehicles,” because that was the court’s reason for decision, but it wouldn’t include anything else the court said.
A real-world example is the Supreme Court’s 2013 decision
in American Express Co v Italian Colors Restaurant,39 which involved a small-claim class action brought by several merchants
against American Express (AmEx).40 The merchants cited a line
of cases beginning with the Court’s 1985 decision in Mitsubishi
Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc,41 which had observed
that Sherman Act claims are arbitrable so long as the litigant “effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum.”42 Citing Mitsubishi and its progeny, the merchants contended that the arbitration clause in their contract with AmEx

35

Id at 691.
Morrison, 487 US at 689–91 (recasting the reasoning of Humphrey’s Executor). For
a similar treatment of Morrison, see Dorf, 142 U Pa L Rev at 2020–22 (cited in note 9).
37 See, for example, Pruitt v Levi Strauss & Co, 932 F2d 458, 465 (5th Cir 1991);
WWC Holding Co, Inc v Sopkin, 488 F3d 1262, 1271 n 6 (10th Cir 2007). See also K.N.
Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush: On Our Law and Its Study 45 (Oceana 1951); A.W.B. Simpson, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case and the Doctrine of Binding Precedent, in A.G. Guest,
ed, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 148, 161 (Oxford 1961) (“[O]nly a rule (or rules) acted
upon in court can rank as a binding rule.”).
38 One well-known problem for this approach is that it has difficulty explaining alternative rationales. Since both rationales are sufficient, neither is necessary, suggesting
counterintuitively that neither rationale is a holding. See Abramowicz and Stearns, 57
Stan L Rev at 1056–58 (cited in note 1); Williams, 69 Stan L Rev at 826–27 (cited in note 3).
39 570 US 228 (2013).
40 Id at 231.
41 473 US 614 (1985).
42 Id at 637 (emphasis added).
36
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was unenforceable because it prevented them from bringing their
claims on a class-wide basis and therefore prevented them from
“effectively vindicating” their statutory rights.43 In particular,
they argued they would “have no economic incentive to pursue
their antitrust claims individually in arbitration” because the cost
of doing so would exceed their potential recovery.44
The Court disagreed, observing that Mitsubishi’s statement
about “effective vindication” was “dictum” because the Court had
ultimately “[d]ismiss[ed] concerns that the arbitral forum was inadequate.”45 Writing in dissent, Justice Elena Kagan argued the
effective-vindication rule was “a core part of Mitsubishi” because
it was an “essential condition” for the Court to find that arbitration was an appropriate forum.46 But that didn’t matter, the majority concluded, because the effective-vindication rule wasn’t the
affirmative reason for the Court’s ruling.47
C. But-for Condition for the Outcome
A third way of parsing the necessity model defines a holding
as any proposition of law that was an essential condition for the
outcome.48 To determine whether a statement is a holding, ask
whether the court would have reached the same result had it asserted the statement’s opposite. If so, the statement is dictum; if
not, the statement is a holding.49 In the tricycle-in-the-park example, the proposition that human-powered objects aren’t “vehicles”
is a holding because the outcome would have been different had
the court determined that the parkgoer was riding a non-humanpowered vehicle.

43

American Express, 570 US at 235–36.
Id at 235.
45 Id. The same went for each of the subsequent cases that had cited Mitsubishi for
its effective-vindication rule. Id.
46 Id at 247 (Kagan dissenting).
47 See American Express, 570 US at 235–36 (majority).
48 See, for example, Tyler, 533 US at 663 n 4; Díaz-Rodríguez v Pep Boys Corp, 410
F3d 56, 60 (1st Cir 2005); In re Hearn, 376 F3d 447, 453–54 (5th Cir 2004); California
Public Employees’ Retirement System v WorldCom, Inc, 368 F3d 86, 106 n 19 (2d Cir 2004);
DaimlerChrysler Corp v United States, 361 F3d 1378, 1384–85 (Fed Cir 2004); Figg v
Schroeder, 312 F3d 625, 643 n 14 (4th Cir 2002); PDV Midwest Refining, LLC v Armada
Oil and Gas Co, 305 F3d 498, 510 (6th Cir 2002); In re Tuttle, 291 F3d 1238, 1242–43 (10th
Cir 2002); In re McDonald, 205 F3d 606, 612 (3d Cir 2000); United States v Eggersdorf,
126 F3d 1318, 1322 n 4 (11th Cir 1997); Robinson v Norris, 60 F3d 457, 460 (8th Cir 1995).
49 See Eugene Wambaugh, The Study of Cases § 13 at 18 (Little, Brown 2d ed 1894);
Leval, 81 NYU L Rev at 1257 (cited in note 3).
44
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A real-world example is Justice Antonin Scalia’s 2013 dissent
in United States v Windsor,50 which involved a constitutional challenge to the Defense of Marriage Act’s (DOMA) exclusion of samesex partners from the definition of a “spouse.”51 Although the federal government continued to enforce DOMA—for instance, by refusing Edith Windsor certain spousal tax benefits—President
Barack Obama had publicly stated that the statute was unconstitutional and had instructed the Justice Department not to defend
it in court.52 Because of that position, there was some question
whether the parties were sufficiently adverse to support Article III jurisdiction.
In 1983, the Immigration and Naturalization Service v
Chadha53 case reached the Court in a similarly odd procedural
posture. There, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) had argued that the relevant immigration statute’s socalled “legislative veto” provision was unconstitutional but indicated that it intended to follow the statute in the absence of a
contrary court order.54 When the case reached the Supreme Court,
one question was whether the parties were sufficiently adverse
for Article III jurisdiction because they had taken the same position on the merits. The Court concluded there was adversity: first,
because the House of Representatives had intervened to defend
the statute; and second, because the INS had said it “would have
deported Chadha” notwithstanding its view of the one-chamber
veto.55
In Windsor, the majority cited Chadha for the proposition
that the executive branch’s refusal “to provide the relief sought
. . . preserve[s] a justiciable dispute.”56 But in dissent, Justice
Scalia maintained that Chadha’s second rationale had been “the
purest dictum” because “congressional intervention” had put “the
required adverseness beyond doubt.”57 In other words, Chadha’s
discussion of the INS’s intention to enforce the law was dictum
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570 US 744 (2013).
Id at 752.
52 Id at 754. See also Peter Baker, For Obama, Tricky Balancing Act in Enforcing
Defense of Marriage Act (NY Times, Mar 28, 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/MGM4
-7GCL.
53 462 US 919 (1983).
54 Id at 928, 939.
55 Id at 930 n 5, 939.
56 Windsor, 570 US at 759, citing Chadha, 462 US at 939.
57 Windsor, 570 US at 784 (Scalia dissenting) (quotation marks omitted).
51
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because it was superfluous—the outcome would’ve been the same
even if the INS hadn’t been willing to enforce the law.
D. On the Analytical Route to the Outcome
A fourth way of articulating the necessity model posits that a
statement is a holding if it was along the analytical route to the
outcome.58 This view recognizes that, because certain legal doctrines are lexically ordered, certain grounds of decision can be
reached only after first resolving other legal questions.
A recent illustration is National Federation of Independent
Business v Sebelius59 (NFIB). That case involved, among other
things, a constitutional challenge to the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate, which required most Americans to purchase
health insurance on pain of paying a “penalty” to the Internal
Revenue Service.60 The federal government argued it had the constitutional authority to enact the individual mandate as an exercise of its power to regulate interstate commerce and its power to
raise taxes.61
Writing for himself—but making similar arguments to the
four other conservatives—Chief Justice John Roberts first observed that, on its most natural reading, the individual mandate
wasn’t a tax-raising measure.62 On that reading, the statute’s constitutionality would depend entirely on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce. He then concluded that the individual
mandate wasn’t a valid exercise of the commerce power because
it forced individuals to enter the stream of commerce against their

58 Both Professor Michael C. Dorf and Professors Michael Abramowicz and Maxwell
Stearns offer similar approaches. For Dorf, a statement of law is a holding if “[i]t forms an
essential ingredient in the process by which the court decides the case.” Dorf, 142 U Pa L Rev
at 2045 (emphasis added) (cited in note 9). Similarly, Abramowicz and Stearns posit that a
“holding consists of those propositions along the chosen decisional path or paths of reasoning
that (1) are actually decided, (2) are based upon the facts of the case, and (3) lead to the judgment.” Abramowicz and Stearns, 57 Stan L Rev at 1065 (cited in note 1).
59 567 US 519 (2012).
60 Id at 539.
61 Id at 536–37. See also US Const Art I, § 8, cl 3 (commerce power); US Const Art I,
§ 8, cl 1 (tax power).
62 NFIB, 567 US at 562–63 (Roberts writing only for himself in this portion of the
opinion). The Court’s four other conservatives concluded that the individual mandate was
not a tax. Id at 661–69 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).
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will.63 In a section of the opinion joined by the four liberals, however, Chief Justice Roberts explained that the individual mandate could be charitably construed as a tax and that, so construed,
it was a valid exercise of Congress’s power to raise taxes.64
Did the Court hold that the individual mandate wasn’t a
valid exercise of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce? Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg didn’t think so. Her partial
dissent called that portion of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion a
“Commerce Clause essay” and said there was “no reason to undertake a Commerce Clause analysis that is not outcome determinative.”65 But the chief justice thought otherwise. In his view,
the individual mandate was most naturally read as “a command
to buy insurance.”66 It was “only because the Commerce Clause
does not authorize such a command that it [was] necessary to
reach the taxing power question.”67 Notice, however, that the chief
justice’s argument for the necessity of the Commerce Clause ruling doesn’t employ the same sense of “necessity” as any of the approaches discussed above.68 Instead, the Commerce Clause ruling
was “necessary” in the sense that it was an integral part of the
Court’s process of reasoning toward the outcome. NFIB thus puts
forward yet another way of understanding the necessity model.
E. Necessity Model Carveouts
Federal jurisprudence on the holding/dictum distinction also
contains several lines of doctrine that cannot easily be squared
with the necessity model.69 Consider, for example, cases brought
under 42 USC § 1983 where a defendant asserts qualified immunity. To defeat the assertion of qualified immunity, the plaintiff
must establish not only that an officer’s conduct violated her constitutional rights but also that the right was clearly established

63 Id at 575 (Roberts writing only for himself in this portion of the opinion). The other
four conservatives also concluded that the individual mandate was not valid under the
Commerce Clause. Id at 649–60 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito dissenting).
64 Id at 574 (majority).
65 Id at 623–24 & n 12 (Ginsburg concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part).
66 NFIB, 567 US at 574 (Roberts writing only for himself in this portion of the opinion).
67 Id (emphasis added).
68 See Lawrence B. Solum, How NFIB v. Sebelius Affects the Constitutional Gestalt,
91 Wash U L Rev 1, 24–34 (2013) (noting various senses in which the Commerce Clause
ruling could be considered “necessary”).
69 See Nancy Leong, Rethinking the Order of Battle in Constitutional Torts: A Reply
to John Jeffries, 105 Nw U L Rev 969, 977–78 (2011).

1564

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1551

at the time the conduct occurred.70 Thus, a defendant who has violated a plaintiff’s constitutional rights will prevail if the plaintiff
cannot show that the right was clearly established at the time of
the relevant events. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has said
that a judicial decision can establish that particular police conduct is unconstitutional even where the officer isn’t ultimately
held liable.71 In other words, constitutional rulings can establish
law, even when they’re unnecessary for the judgment. As the
Court wrote in Camreta v Greene,72 “[t]he constitutional determinations that prevailing parties ask us to consider in [ ] cases [involving § 1983] are not mere dicta or ‘statements in opinions.’ . . .
[T]hey are rulings self-consciously designed to [affect public officials’ conduct] by establishing controlling law and preventing invocations of immunity in later cases.”73 Indeed, for a time the
Court even required lower courts deciding qualified immunity
cases to opine on the constitutionality of an officer’s conduct before addressing whether the asserted constitutional right had
been clearly established.74
Similarly, in cases involving claims of harmless error, the Supreme Court has suggested that courts should decide whether an
error occurred before determining whether the error was harmless.75 And in cases involving the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, it has stated that courts may determine that a
particular law enforcement officer’s conduct was in fact constitutional, even if it ultimately concludes that the officer believed it
to be so in good faith.76 Under each of these bodies of doctrine, the
Supreme Court appears to believe that judicial opinions can establish law even when they aren’t necessary for the outcome. But
the Court has never explained how the development of case law
in these subject areas can be reconciled with its broader adherence to the necessity model.

70

Harlow v Fitzgerald, 457 US 800, 818 (1982).
Camreta v Greene, 563 US 692, 702–03 (2011).
72 563 US 692 (2011).
73 Id at 704–05. See also Pearson v Callahan, 555 US 223, 236 (2009).
74 Saucier v Katz, 533 US 194, 200–07 (2001), overruled by Pearson, 555 US at 236.
75 Lockhart v Fretwell, 506 US 364, 369 n 2 (1993) (“Harmless-error analysis is triggered only after the reviewing court discovers that an error has been committed.”) (emphasis in original).
76 United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 924–25 (1984).
71
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***
The picture of the necessity model that emerges is one of
wide-ranging inconsistency both in determining the holdings of
cases and in articulating a jurisdiction’s substantive rules of law.
Indeed, it is common for a court to proclaim a principle for identifying the holding of one case only to violate that principle in the
next case. That inconsistency undermines the rule-of-law values
that precedent is intended to serve. It diminishes the law’s finality by giving litigants an incentive to relitigate previously adjudicated issues in the hope that a court will treat an earlier ruling
as dicta.77 It diminishes the law’s predictability by changing the
test that a court will use to determine the content of existing case
law.78 And it diminishes the law’s fairness by changing its content
based on the particular framework for determining a case’s holding that a court happens to use in any particular case.79

77 Precedent is often said to promote finality by taking issues off the table. See Kimble v Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S Ct 2401, 2409 (2015); Benjamin N. Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (Yale 1921); Farber, 90 Minn L Rev at 1177 (cited in
note 9); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 Stan L Rev 571, 572–73 (1987); Richard H. Fallon Jr, Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76
NYU L Rev 570, 581 & n 46 (2001); Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in
Judicial Decisions, 73 Cornell L Rev 422, 430–33 (1988); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in
Economic Perspective: An Economic Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Doctrine of Precedent,
78 NC L Rev 643, 648–53 (2000); Jonathan R. Macey, The Internal and External Costs and
Benefits of Stare Decisis, 65 Chi Kent L Rev 93, 102 (1989).
78 Precedent is often believed to make the law more predictable. See Alexander, 63 S
Cal L Rev at 13–14 (cited in note 1); Earl Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 NC L Rev
367, 368–69 (1988); Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Reliance, 62 Emory L J 1459, 1465–69
(2013); Waldron, 111 Mich L Rev at 4 (cited in note 1); Zenon Bankowski, D. Neil MacCormick, Lech Morawski, and Alfonso Ruiz Miguel, Rationales for Precedent, in D. Neil MacCormick and Robert S. Summers, eds, Interpreting Precedents 481, 487 (Dartmouth 1997);
David Lyons, Formal Justice and Judicial Precedent, 38 Vand L Rev 495, 496 (1985); Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional Doctrine, 11 Harv J L & Pub Pol 67, 70 (1988).
79 Precedent is often thought to promote fairness by ensuring reasonable consistency
across cases. See Henry M. Hart Jr and Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems
in the Making and Application of Law 569 (Foundation 1994) (asserting that precedent secures “reasonable uniformity of decision”); Farber, 90 Minn L Rev at 1178–80 (cited in note
9); Randy E. Barnett, Trumping Precedent with Original Meaning: Not as Radical as It
Sounds, 22 Const Comment 257, 259 (2005); Alexander, 63 S Cal L Rev at 9–10 (cited in note
1); Waldron, 111 Mich L Rev at 4 (cited in note 1); Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 225–75
(Harvard 1986). For criticism of the idea that equality is a sound reason for judicial action,
see Christopher J. Peters, Equality Revisited, 110 Harv L Rev 1210, 1263 & n 84 (1997).
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II. INTRODUCING THE ADJUDICATIVE MODEL
Outcome necessity isn’t an inevitable feature of the holding/dictum distinction. A different approach—which I call the “adjudicative model”—prevails in Arizona, Illinois, Maryland, and
Minnesota.80 Courts in those jurisdictions treat a ruling as authoritative if it expressly resolved an issue that was part of the
case.81 In Maryland, for example, a holding is any ruling on an
issue that “was directly involved in the issues of law raised by the
[case], and the mind of the Court was directly drawn to, and distinctly expressed upon the subject.”82 “[A]lthough the final judgment in the case may be rooted in another point also raised by the
record,” an earlier ruling is “authoritative” because it was established through “an application of the judicial mind” to an issue
raised in the case.83 Courts in Illinois, Arizona, and Minnesota
follow a similar rule, using slightly different terminology.84
80 Several other state courts have recently issued opinions espousing the adjudicative model, but it’s too soon to tell whether the model will take hold. See Leider v Lewis,
394 P3d 1055, 1063 (Cal 2017); Magee v Boyd, 175 S3d 79, 101 (Ala 2015); Jamerson v
Heimgartner, 372 P3d 1236, 1241–42 (Kan 2016). Further, one line of Wisconsin cases
follows the necessity model, while another line follows the adjudicative model. Compare
State v Bruendl, 483 NW2d 238, 241 (Wis App 1992); State v Sartin, 546 NW2d 449, 454–
55 (Wis 1996), with State v Sanders, 737 NW2d 44, 51 (Wis App 2007); State v Holt, 382
NW2d 679, 686 (Wis App 1985). The state’s high court has acknowledged, but not resolved,
the apparent tension. See Zarder v Humana Insurance Co, 782 NW2d 682, 693 (Wis 2010).
A glimpse of the adjudicative model can also be seen in one old Supreme Court decision:
“It cannot be said that a case is not authority on one point because, although that point
was properly presented and decided in the regular course of the consideration of the cause,
something else was found in the end which disposed of the whole matter.” Railroad Cos v
Schutte, 103 US 118, 143 (1880).
81 Professor Melvin Aron Eisenberg argued for a similar approach to stare decisis:
“[T]he rule of a precedent consists of the rule it states, provided that rule is relevant to the
issues raised by the dispute before the court.” Eisenberg, Nature of the Common Law at
55 (cited in note 3). See also Bayern, 36 Fla St U L Rev at 143–67 (cited in note 3) (building
on Eisenberg’s approach).
82 Schmidt v Prince George’s Hospital, 784 A2d 1112, 1121 (Md 2001), quoting
Carstairs v Cochran, 52 A 601, 601 (Md 1902).
83 Schmidt, 784 A2d at 1121. See also Brooks v Housing Authority of Baltimore City,
984 A2d 836, 846 (Md 2009); Piney Orchard Community Association v Maryland Department of the Environment, 149 A3d 1175, 1191 (Md App 2016); Bowers v State, 133 A3d
1254, 1261 (Md App 2016); Kaye v Wilson-Gaskins, 135 A3d 892, 901–02 (Md App 2016).
84 Those courts distinguish between “judicial dicta” (statements that decide an issue
in the case that turns out not to be dispositive) and “obiter dicta” (statements that don’t
decide an issue in the case). While the latter aren’t authoritative, the former are because
they are “expression[s] emanating from the judicial conscience and the responsibilities
that go with it.” State v Rainer, 103 NW2d 389, 396 (Minn 1960). See State v Heinonen,
909 NW2d 584, 589 n 4 (Minn 2018); Ries v State, 920 NW2d 620, 635 n 8 (Minn 2018);
Cates v Cates, 619 NE2d 715, 717–18 (Ill 1993); Exelon Corp v Department of Revenue, 917
NE2d 899, 907 (Ill 2009); Lebron v Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 930 NE2d 895, 907 (Ill
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Before the turn of the century, the adjudicative model was a
phenomenon limited to the state courts. But in the early 2000s,
the Ninth Circuit rapidly adopted that model as the governing
framework for determining the content of its own case law. The
remainder of this Part tells the fascinating story of that
transformation.85
A. The Ninth Circuit Adopts the Adjudicative Model
Before 2001, the Ninth Circuit followed the necessity model.86
But that approach began to change with the court’s 2001 decision
in United States v Johnson.87 In that case, officers had entered a
fenced yard while attempting to apprehend a third-party suspect.
They smelled marijuana coming from a detached shed, obtained
a search warrant, and found contraband.88 The district court denied the shed owner’s motion to suppress because the initial
search occurred under exigent circumstances while the officers
were in hot pursuit.89 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with
those conclusions, but remanded the case to allow the district
court to determine whether the initial search had occurred in the
curtilage of the defendant’s home.90
In a separate opinion, a different six-judge majority opined
that a court of appeals reviews de novo whether a search takes

2010); Schweihs v Chase Home Finance, LLC, 77 NE3d 50, 60–61 (Ill 2017); Alejandro v
Harrison, 219 P3d 231, 235 (Ariz App 2009); State v Fahringer, 666 P2d 514, 515 (Ariz
App 1983); Phelps Dodge Corp v Arizona Department of Water Resources, 118 P3d 1110,
1116 (Ariz App 2005).
85 A handful of sources discuss the Ninth Circuit’s unconventional jurisprudence in
this area. See Bryan A. Garner, et al, The Law of Judicial Precedent 116 n 6 (Thomson
Reuters 2016); Bayern, 36 Fla St U L Rev at 161–63 (cited in note 3); Ryan S. Killian,
Dicta and the Rule of Law, 41 Pepperdine L Rev 1, 10–13 (2013); Leval, 81 NYU L Rev at
1251 (cited in note 3).
86 See, for example, Micro Star v Formgen, Inc, 154 F3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir 1998)
(asserting that a statement in Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc v Nintendo of America, Inc, 964 F2d
965 (9th Cir 1992), was dicta because it was not necessary to the resolution of that case);
United States v Troescher, 99 F3d 933, 935–36 (9th Cir 1996) (same with regard to Fuller
v United States, 786 F2d 1437 (9th Cir 1986)); United States v Enas, 204 F3d 915, 920 (9th
Cir 2000) (same with regard to Means v Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court, 154 F3d 941
(9th Cir 1998)); Export Group v Reef Industries, Inc, 54 F3d 1466, 1472 (9th Cir 1995)
(same with regard to Gregorian v Izvestia, 871 F2d 1515 (9th Cir 1989)).
87 256 F3d 895 (9th Cir 2001) (en banc).
88 Id at 900 (Ferguson majority).
89 Id.
90 See id at 898. If the search didn’t occur in the curtilage, then it took place in an
“open field,” which isn’t protected by the Fourth Amendment. See Hester v United States,
265 US 57, 59 (1924).
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place within the curtilage of a home.91 This was a strange ruling
because it announced the standard of appellate review for an issue the court hadn’t even reached.92 On the necessity model, that
ruling was dicta because it was unnecessary for the outcome. Indeed, Judge A. Wallace Tashima chastised the separate majority
for their “mistaken assertion” that the ruling was a holding.93 The
court’s “musings about the standard of appellate review of curtilage determinations,” he wrote, “are dicta because the Court has
not reviewed any curtilage determination.”94
In response to Judge Tashima, four judges in a separate opinion explained why they believed the ruling on the standard of appellate review was a holding.95 Those judges openly criticized the
court’s inconsistency in applying the necessity model in prior
cases.96 That model, they argued, had created uncertainty for litigants because “lawyers advising their clients would have to
guess whether a later panel will recognize a ruling . . . as [ ] having been necessary.”97
The court’s inconsistency applying the holding/dictum distinction was also troubling to judges besides those on the Johnson
panel. In interviews I conducted for this Article,98 one judge observed that there was a general sentiment at the time that the

91

Johnson, 256 F3d at 913 (Kozinski majority).
Five judges would have held that the initial search took place outside the curtilage.
Id at 919 (Kozinski) (plurality). Judge Richard Paez, however, wanted the district court to
address the curtilage issue in the first instance. See id at 922 (Paez concurring).
93 Id at 919 (Tashima concurring).
94 Id.
95 The explanation of their view is contained in Part III.B of Judge Alex Kozinski’s
opinion, which Judges Ronald Gould and Richard Paez didn’t join. See Johnson, 256 F3d at
914–16 (Kozinski) (plurality); id at 921–22 (Gould concurring); id at 922 (Paez concurring).
96 Id at 914 (Kozinski) (plurality).
97 Id at 915.
98 In researching this Article, I conducted anonymous interviews with sixteen Ninth
Circuit judges, for which I received Internal Review Board approval. I sent letters to
thirty-five active and senior Ninth Circuit judges inviting them to participate. Sixteen
accepted my invitation. I interviewed three in person and thirteen over the phone. I transcribed all responses on a computer. The interviewees weren’t a random sample, but they
are diverse: appointed by presidents from both political parties and of different ages, races,
genders, years of judicial service, and representative of a broad ideological spectrum on
the Judicial Common Space. (For a description of the Judicial Common Space, see
note 164.) Each interview lasted approximately thirty minutes and followed the same
script of questions. I asked whether the interviewees were aware of the circuit’s adoption
of the adjudicative model; whether the adjudicative model had been invoked in one of their
cases, and if so, whether it had affected their decision-making; whether they had ever told
a visiting judge about the adjudicative model; whether they agreed with the adjudicative
model on the merits; whether they believe they are bound by the adjudicative model;
92
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distinction had been “manipulated to get to where a [judge]
wanted to go, in terms of the outcome of the case. [A judge]
[would] ha[ve] a broad understanding of the holding, if [she]
thought the [case] law was right. . . . And if [she] didn’t like the
case [law], [she]’d think it was dicta.”99 Further, these disagreements often seemed tinged with an ideological valence. It frequently appeared that “a liberal panel would write an opinion and
a conservative panel could come along and say that’s all dicta.
And vice versa.”100
To solve this perceived problem, four judges on the Johnson
panel proposed what I have called the adjudicative model:
“[W]here a panel confronts an issue germane to the eventual resolution of the case, and resolves it after reasoned consideration in
a published opinion, that ruling becomes the law of the circuit,
regardless of whether doing so is necessary in some strict logical
sense.”101 In other words, “a decision on any issue that is part of
the Article III controversy could be binding.”102 The opinion thus
proposed a substantial “expansion of the concept of a holding.”103
Johnson launched a four-year debate in the Ninth Circuit.
Some judges began following the adjudicative model,104 believing
it supplied “a clear[er] rule”105 and would make the court’s case
law “more uniform[ ].”106 But other judges continued to follow the
whether they believe well-considered dicta is “clearly established law” in the Ninth Circuit; what they believe are the adjudicative model’s advantages and disadvantages; and
whether they believe the adjudicative model has affected how Ninth Circuit judges write
opinions. To protect anonymity, I use only female pronouns when referring to the judges;
I omit the locations of the interviews; and I have given each judge a pseudonym—for example, Judge A, Judge B, etc. Although I structured the interviews by asking each judge
the same set of questions, there’s always the possibility that the interviewees told me what
they thought I wanted to hear or what they thought would be most flattering to them. I
did not, however, reveal my own hypotheses to the judges, and they generally appeared to
answer candidly.
99 Telephone Interview with Judge M, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit (Dec 11, 2018) (notes for all interviews on file with author) (Judge M Interview).
100 Id.
101 Johnson, 256 F3d at 914 (Kozinski) (plurality).
102 Telephone Interview with Judge O, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (Jan 15, 2019) (Judge O Interview).
103 Judge M Interview (cited in note 99).
104 See, for example, United States v Brandon P., 387 F3d 969, 974 (9th Cir 2004);
Universal Health Services, Inc v Thompson, 363 F3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir 2004); Brand X
Internet Services v FCC, 345 F3d 1120, 1130 (9th Cir 2003); Miranda B. v Kitzhaber, 328
F3d 1181, 1186 (9th Cir 2003).
105 Telephone Interview with Judge K, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (Dec 12, 2018) (Judge K Interview).
106 Telephone Interview with Judge D, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (Jan 3, 2019) (Judge D Interview).
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necessity model.107 And a few labored to stay out of the fight entirely, explaining why particular statements in earlier cases were
dicta “on any view of that concept.”108
In a noteworthy flashpoint, Judge Stephen Reinhardt (joined
by ten of his colleagues) excoriated a three-judge panel for reaching out to offer what he considered an “advisory opinion” on Arizona’s death penalty procedure.109 And in a separate statement,
five judges took issue with Judge Reinhardt’s opinion, observing
that it was a “dangerous practice” for judges to advise the public
“to ignore portions of an opinion that commands a majority of the
panel.”110
The proponents of the adjudicative model eventually declared
themselves the winners in 2005. The circuit’s decision in Barapind v Enomoto111 involved how to interpret its earlier decision in
Quinn v Robinson.112 In Quinn, an Irish Republican Army member had challenged his extradition to the United Kingdom.113 The
Ninth Circuit opined that a two-prong test determines whether
the petitioner was eligible for the “political offense” exception to
the relevant extradition treaty. And it ruled that he was extraditable because he couldn’t establish the first prong.114 The court
then went on to clarify the analysis required under the second
prong, setting out a rule of law that it hadn’t invoked to resolve
the petitioner’s case.115 Nearly twenty years later in Barapind, the
district court and the three-judge panel concluded that Quinn’s

107 See, for example, United States v Sarbia, 367 F3d 1079, 1084 n 3 (9th Cir 2004);
Lombardo v Warner, 353 F3d 774, 785–86 (9th Cir 2003) (B. Fletcher dissenting); Lopez v
Washington Mutual Bank, FA, 302 F3d 900, 905 n 4 (9th Cir 2002); Best Life Assurance
Co of California v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 281 F3d 828, 834 (9th Cir 2002).
108 Coalition of Clergy, Lawyers, and Professors v Bush, 310 F3d 1153, 1166 (9th Cir
2002) (Berzon concurring). See also Cetacean Community v Bush, 386 F3d 1169, 1173 (9th
Cir 2004); Cornejo-Barreto v Siefert, 379 F3d 1075, 1082 (9th Cir 2004); Parents Involved in
Community Schools v Seattle School District, No 1, 377 F3d 949, 978 & n 37 (9th Cir 2004);
Inlandboatmens Union of the Pacific v Dutra Group, 279 F3d 1075, 1081 (9th Cir 2002).
109 Spears v Stewart, 283 F3d 992, 999 (9th Cir 2002) (Reinhardt dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc).
110 Id at 1005–07 (Kozinski statement concerning the denial of rehearing en banc).
111 400 F3d 744 (9th Cir 2005) (en banc).
112 783 F2d 776 (9th Cir 1986).
113 Id at 783–85.
114 Id at 806–08.
115 Id at 809–10.
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discussion of the second prong was dicta because the case had
been decided on the first prong alone.116
Several judges I interviewed said they voted to rehear Barapind en banc to clarify the court’s framework for determining the
holdings of earlier cases.117 And that’s what the court did. The en
banc panel criticized the district court for “operat[ing] under a
mistaken understanding of what constitutes circuit law.”118
Quinn’s second prong was the “law of the circuit,” the court observed, because Quinn had “addressed the issue . . . in an opinion
joined in relevant part by a majority of the panel.”119 And that was
true whether or not Quinn’s statements were “in some technical
sense ‘necessary’ to [the] disposition of the case.”120 Finally, the
opinion said the adjudicative model would thereafter “constitute[ ] authoritative circuit law.”121
In partial dissent, Judge Pamela Rymer (joined by four colleagues) called the majority opinion “dicta [about] dicta.”122 “We

116 See Barapind, 400 F3d at 750 (describing the extraditing court’s order); Barapind
v Enomoto, 360 F3d 1061, 1075 (9th Cir 2004) (“Barapind rests his argument entirely on
the dicta in Quinn.”), revd, 400 F3d 744 (en banc).
117 Judge M Interview (cited in note 99); In-Person Interview with Judge F, Circuit
Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Dec 10, 2018) (Judge F Interview).
118 Barapind, 400 F3d at 750.
119 Id at 750–51.
120 Id at 751.
121 Id at 751 n 8. That particular declaration raises interesting questions about a
court’s authority to modify interpretive rules. Do federal judges have the authority to require their colleagues to follow a particular methodology when interpreting case law?
Should they? See Kisor v Wilkie, 139 S Ct 2400, 2444 (2019) (Gorsuch concurring in the
judgment) (questioning whether stare decisis applies to Auer deference for agencies’ interpretations of their own rules). On one hand, creating interpretive frameworks can stabilize
the process of legal interpretation. See note 18 and accompanying text. On the other, the
power to create interpretive rules could allow a narrow majority to impose a controversial
judicial philosophy on other judges. See Randy J. Kozel, Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, and the Law of Stare Decisis, 97 Tex L Rev 1125, 1148–51 (2019); Evan
J. Criddle and Glen Staszewski, Against Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 Georgetown L
J 1573, 1592 (2014). Barapind itself raises the specter of this concern. In that case, six
judges purported to tell the rest of a roughly thirty-judge court how to interpret prior case
law. And as one judge pointedly observed, the decision to do so may have had something
to do with President George W. Bush’s judicial nominees beginning to fill the federal bench
in substantial numbers. Judge M Interview (cited in note 99). My own tentative view is
that courts may create interpretive rules by incorporating them over time into the jurisdiction’s common law. In other words, interpretive rules become part of the jurisdiction’s
law, not through the fiat of a majority in a single case, but through the slow accretion of
cases applying those rules in a regular course of decisions. For a similar account of how
interpretive rules can change, see William Baude and Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 Harv L Rev 1079, 1138–39 (2017).
122 Barapind, 400 F3d at 758 (Rymer concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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are now sitting en banc,” she wrote, “and therefore can declare
the law as we believe it to be regardless of what we have previously held.”123 In her view, whether Quinn’s statements were
holdings or dicta was irrelevant because the en banc panel could
freely adopt whatever law on the merits it preferred, no matter
what an earlier three-judge panel had said. Judge Rymer also believed the majority’s proposed framework was ill advised because
it would “invite[ ] overwriting that may be difficult or impossible
to cure.”124 Finally, she maintained, the adjudicative model violated Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement.125
B. The Adjudicative Model Sticks
The adjudicative model’s lasting significance was hardly a
foregone conclusion the day Barapind was decided. Five judges
dissented. And to this day, judges continue to think Barapind was
“ridiculous[ly]” wrong.126 Further, there wouldn’t be much the proponents of the adjudicative model could have done, if their colleagues had decided to continue following the necessity model.127
But that isn’t what happened. In dozens of cases, Johnson,
Barapind, and their progeny have been cited for the proposition
that the adjudicative model is the governing framework in the
Ninth Circuit.128 In fact, nearly every judge who disagreed with
123

Id.
Id at 759.
125 Id (“We speak through panels of three, and as Article III judges[, we] have authority only to decide cases and controversies. Everything that ends up in F.3d cannot possibly
be the law of the circuit.”). For a response to this constitutional concern, see Part V.
126 Telephone Interview with Judge H, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (Dec 3, 2018) (Judge H Interview). See also Telephone Interview with Judge
J, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Dec 14, 2018); Telephone
Interview with Judge B, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Dec 14,
2018) (Judge B Interview); Telephone Interview with Judge E, Circuit Judge, US Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Dec 19, 2018) (Judge E Interview); Telephone Interview
with Judge I, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Dec 12, 2018)
(Judge I Interview).
127 Although adopting the adjudicative model was a controversial move, I don’t detect
an ideological pattern in the votes to adopt it. Combining the votes in Johnson and Barapind,
nine judges approved of the adjudicative model; seven were Democratic appointees and two
were Republican appointees. Twelve judges declined to join opinions in favor of the adjudicative model; nine were Democratic appointees and three were Republican appointees.
128 See, for example, United States v Tydingco, 909 F3d 297, 303 (9th Cir 2018);
Hornish v King County, 899 F3d 680, 693 (9th Cir 2018); Snapp v United Transportation
Union, 889 F3d 1088, 1099 (9th Cir 2018); Scott v Gino Morena Enterprises, LLC, 888 F3d
1101, 1109 (9th Cir 2018); Lenz v Universal Music Corp, 815 F3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir 2016);
United States v Boitano, 796 F3d 1160, 1164 (9th Cir 2015); Ayala v Wong, 756 F3d 656,
687 n 22 (9th Cir 2014); United States v Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F3d 1012, 1016 n 5 (9th Cir
124
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the adjudicative model in Johnson and Barapind has subsequently written or joined opinions invoking it as the governing
framework.129
The interviews told a similar story. Most interviewees said
the adjudicative model is the proper way to determine the holding
of a Ninth Circuit case.130 Some mentioned Johnson or Barapind
by name and said those cases are “binding,”131 “established now
for . . . years,”132 “settled” law,133 the “consensus approach,”134 and

2013); Scott v Chappell, 547 F Appx 815, 816 (9th Cir 2013); United States v Esparza, 489
F Appx 204, 204 (9th Cir 2012); Marshall Naify Revocable Trust v United States, 672 F3d
620, 627 (9th Cir 2012); Oshodi v Holder, 671 F3d 1002, 1008 n 4 (9th Cir 2012); Gray v
Bank of America Home Loans, 667 F3d 1325, 1329 (9th Cir 2012); United States v Parker,
651 F3d 1180, 1184 (9th Cir 2011); Levi Strauss & Co v Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co,
633 F3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir 2011); United States v Luong, 627 F3d 1306, 1310 (9th Cir
2010); Garcia v Holder, 621 F3d 906, 911 (9th Cir 2010); Morales-Garcia v Holder, 567
F3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir 2009); United States v Cruz, 554 F3d 840, 849 n 13 (9th Cir 2009);
United States v Bond, 552 F3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir 2009); In re Tippett, 542 F3d 684, 691–
92 (9th Cir 2008); Seven Up Pete Venture v Schweitzer, 523 F3d 948, 953 (9th Cir 2008);
Sanchez v Mukasey, 521 F3d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir 2008); United States v Ingham, 486 F3d
1068, 1078 n 8 (9th Cir 2007); United States v Boulware, 470 F3d 931, 934 (9th Cir 2006);
Sinotes-Cruz v Gonzales, 468 F3d 1190, 1203 (9th Cir 2006); United States v Salazar-Gonzalez, 458 F3d 851, 856 n 2 (9th Cir 2006); United States v Curtin, 443 F3d 1084, 1091 n 1
(9th Cir 2006); Sosa v DIRECTV, Inc, 437 F3d 923, 928 n 3 (9th Cir 2006); Padilla v Lever,
429 F3d 910, 916 (9th Cir 2005); United States v Davis, 428 F3d 802, 809 (9th Cir 2005)
(Callahan dissenting in part); United States v Dupas, 419 F3d 916, 921 (9th Cir 2005);
United States v Cassel, 408 F3d 622, 633 n 9 (9th Cir 2005); Moreno v Baca, 400 F3d 1152,
1173 (9th Cir 2005); Brandon P., 387 F3d at 974; Luong v Circuit City Stores, Inc, 356 F3d
1188, 1198 (9th Cir 2004) (Kozinski dissenting); Brand X Internet Services, 345 F3d at
1130; Miranda B., 328 F3d at 1186.
129 See, for example, Vidal-Mendoza, 705 F3d at 1016 n 5 (Tallman and Tashima joining the majority); In re Tippett, 542 F3d at 691–92 (Rawlinson joining the majority); Boulware, 470 F3d at 934 (Rymer joining the majority); Marshall Naify Revocable Trust, 672
F3d at 627 (Callahan joining the majority); Ingham, 486 F3d at 1078 n 8 (Gould) (majority); United States v Aguila-Montes de Oca, 655 F3d 915, 950–51 (9th Cir 2011) (en banc)
(Berzon concurring in the judgment).
130 There were a few exceptions. See, for example, Judge E Interview (cited in
note 126) (“I think the idea that a rule emerged [is] a . . . very controversial proposition.”).
131 Telephone Interview with Judge A, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit (Nov 30, 2018) (Judge A Interview); In-Person Interview with Judge L, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Dec 10, 2018) (Judge L Interview)
(“I think I would [be bound].”); Judge K Interview (cited in note 105) (“I think it would be
[binding]. And if we don’t like [the dicta rule], then we take that en banc.”); Telephone
Interview with Judge P, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Jan 23,
2019) (Judge P Interview) (“I think I am bound by it.”); In-Person Interview with Judge
N, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Jan 11, 2019) (Judge N Interview) (“I’m in the category that—if that’s the rule we’ve been told we’re supposed to
follow, then we should follow it.”).
132 Judge B Interview (cited in note 126).
133 Judge F Interview (cited in note 117).
134 Id.

1574

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1551

“the rule of decision.”135 Several judges said they could remember
cases where their view of an issue had turned on the circuit’s
broad definition of a holding.136 Indeed, without going into specifics, two judges said they had pending cases that were like this.137
One judge said she makes a point of educating her law clerks on
the topic each year.138 Another said her first law clerk, who had
previously clerked for a different Ninth Circuit judge, taught her
about the Barapind framework when she joined the court.139 Several said they had mentioned the framework to visiting judges,
who would likely be unfamiliar with it.140 Finally, one judge said
she believes the adjudicative model is unconstitutional, but nonetheless acknowledged that the Barapind framework is the law of
the Ninth Circuit in the sense that her colleagues treat it that way.141
III. EMPIRICALLY TESTING THE ADJUDICATIVE MODEL
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to adopt the adjudicative model
is striking. “How many courts,” after all, would “go en banc to decide a procedural issue like this”—let alone succeed in convincing
a critical mass of judges to go along with that change?142 Indeed,
several interviewees said visiting judges often find it strange that

135

Judge B Interview (cited in note 126).
See, for example, Judge F Interview (cited in note 117); Telephone Interview with
Judge C, Circuit Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (Dec 14, 2018) (Judge C
Interview).
137 See Judge M Interview (cited in note 99) (“I’m in a fight right now over that very
thing.”); Judge P Interview (cited in note 131). Similarly, in one noteworthy case I found,
all of the judges on a panel concurred in a separately filed opinion because they didn’t
want to “include [their thoughts] in the precedential opinion.” Dela Cruz v Mukasey, 532
F3d 946, 949 n 1 (9th Cir 2008) (Graber concurring). See also Meras v Sisto, 676 F3d 1184,
1193 (9th Cir 2012) (Bea concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (declining to
join the majority opinion because of its dicta and noting that “in the Ninth Circuit, [dicta]
can have precedential effects”).
138 See Judge F Interview (cited in note 117).
139 See Judge P Interview (cited in note 131).
140 See Judge L Interview (cited in note 131); Judge F Interview (cited in note 117);
Judge M Interview (cited in note 99); Judge B Interview (cited in note 126). See also
Judge P Interview (cited in note 131):
136

[W]e have so many visiting judges—so it is an issue that comes up where we
have a visiting judge recommend something that says that this was dicta in this
case so we can ignore it, and we have to say back—that this isn’t the rule in our
circuit. I’ve had that happen at least a couple of times.
141
142

Judge H Interview (cited in note 126).
See Judge M Interview (cited in note 99).
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the Ninth Circuit “mess[ed] around with” a doctrine as fundamental as the holding/dictum distinction.143 But the mere announcement of a new framework doesn’t necessarily mean that judges
will change the way they make decisions or write opinions. This
Part investigates whether they did. And it finds that, after adopting the adjudicative model, the Ninth Circuit was more likely to
follow its own precedents in cases involving disputes about the
holding/dictum distinction.
A. Hypothesis and Data Collection
Some judges voted to adopt the adjudicative model so that
three-judge panels would be more likely to follow the court’s prior
statements of law. The idea was that the adjudicative model
would promote adherence to earlier precedent by expanding the
set of a court’s prior statements that constitute binding law.
To test whether the court’s behavior changed in this fashion,
I first collected a sample of cases where the Ninth Circuit invoked
the holding/dictum distinction by running a search query on
Westlaw for published Ninth Circuit decisions.144 I reviewed cases
from 1993–2013, eight years before the 2001 Johnson decision
and eight years after the 2005 Barapind decision. Using full-text
searches of judicial opinions as a sampling method relies on
judges to acknowledge explicitly that a case involved the holding/dictum distinction. It may therefore introduce bias by omitting those cases where the distinction is genuinely at issue but
where the opinion doesn’t use words matching my search query.
This method nonetheless seemed the best available option for
compiling the dataset. A comprehensive review of all cases over a
certain period would have turned up too many false positives to
sort at reasonable cost. And a random sample of, say, 2 percent of
all opinions over the same period wouldn’t have produced a sufficiently large dataset of relevant cases.145

143

Judge L Interview (cited in note 131). See also Judge B Interview (cited in note 126).
I ran the following query: “dicta dictum ‘not a holding’ ‘not the holding’ 106k92.” I
included the term “106k92” because it’s the Westlaw headnote associated with the topic
“dicta.” I chose such a broad search to ensure a fairly comprehensive dataset, though it
came at the cost of sorting through numerous irrelevant cases.
145 Other empirical studies of precedent have used similar methods for compiling
their datasets. See Stefanie A. Lindquist and Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing
Dworkin’s Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 NYU L Rev 1156, 1180–
81 & n 120 (2005) (describing a full-text search to find cases of first impression); David
Klein and Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice in Lower Court Decision
144

1576

The University of Chicago Law Review

[87:1551

The initial search was, by design, overinclusive. It turned up
1,512 cases. Along with two Stanford Law School students, I reviewed each case and determined whether the passage triggering
the search hit was one where the Ninth Circuit had been asked to
defer to one of its precedents. If not, I excluded it.146 I also excluded an initial opinion where my search also included an
amended opinion in the same case. After excluding irrelevant
cases, the dataset contained 408 cases.147
Each member of the research team reviewed each case and
coded it with one of three values. A case was coded FOLLOW where
the court adopted the proposition asserted in the earlier case. It
was coded CONTRAVENE where the court rejected the proposition
on the ground that it was nonbinding dictum.148 And a case was
coded DISTINGUISH where the court concluded a proposition asserted in an earlier case was irrelevant due to factual differences
between the earlier and later cases.149

Making, 54 Wm & Mary L Rev 2021, 2035 (2013) (describing a full-text search to find cases
involving the holding/dictum distinction).
146 The irrelevant cases generally fell into one of five categories: (1) cases involving
the decision of another circuit, a state court, or the Supreme Court; (2) cases involving the
law-of-the-case doctrine; (3) cases regurgitating the basic tenet of habeas corpus law that
“[c]learly established Federal law refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of the
Supreme Court’s decisions,” Winzer v Hall, 494 F3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir 2007) (quotation
marks omitted); (4) cases mentioning the word “dicta” only in a brief parenthetical observation; and (5) cases where a concurring or dissenting opinion accused the majority of
writing nonbinding dicta. Examples of each of these categories of excluded cases are on
file with The University of Chicago Law Review.
147 Several decisions contained treatments of multiple earlier cases. I treated each of
these as a single event in the dataset, rather than multiple events, because that was the
more conservative approach.
148 A case could fall into this category for several reasons. In some cases, the court
declined to follow an earlier case because it concluded the court’s earlier statement wasn’t
necessary for the outcome. In others, the court concluded the earlier court had merely
made an offhand remark and therefore had not expressly resolved the relevant issue. Yet
others involved opinions on issues not even raised in the earlier case. Thus, some of the
cases coded as CONTRAVENE would count as dicta on some theories of precedent but not on
others, while other cases would count as dicta on any theory of precedent.
149 Examples of each category are on file with The University of Chicago Law Review.
Many empirical legal studies focus on case dispositions—investigating, for example,
whether plaintiffs prevail more frequently than defendants or employers more frequently
than employees under certain conditions. See, for example, Emery G. Lee III, Horizontal
Stare Decisis on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 92 Ky L J 767, 779–80
(2003); Donald R. Songer and Reginald S. Sheehan, Supreme Court Impact on Compliance
and Outcomes: Miranda and New York Times in the United States Courts of Appeals, 43
W Polit Q 297, 302 (1990). A limitation of these studies is that they ignore other important
aspects of judicial decision-making, such as the court’s opinion. See Lee Epstein and Jack
Knight, The Choices Justices Make 22–51 (Congressional Quarterly 1998); Jack Knight,
Are Empiricists Asking the Right Questions About Judicial Decisionmaking?, 58 Duke L J
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When all three reviewers applied the same code, I accepted
it. When we initially applied different codes, we reviewed the case
for a second time. Preliminary coding discrepancies occurred in
approximately 16 percent of cases, and all were resolved during a
second look. There was no discernible pattern to initial discrepancies or to the codes the cases were eventually assigned.
B. Initial Results
If the Ninth Circuit’s behavior didn’t change, we’d expect no
significant change over time in the distribution of the three codes.
But if the Ninth Circuit became more likely to follow its precedents, we’d expect to observe an increase in the frequency of cases
coded FOLLOW. Figure 1 shows the percentages of cases in each
year assigned each code.150

1531, 1532–33 (2009). My analysis contributes to a nascent literature investigating the
role that opinions play in judicial reasoning. See, for example, Barry Friedman and Andrew D. Martin, Looking for Law in All the Wrong Places: Some Suggestions for Modeling
Legal Decision-Making, in Charles Gardner Geyh, ed, What’s Law Got to Do with It? What
Judges Do, Why They Do It, and What’s at Stake 143, 165–66 (Stanford 2011); Cliff Carrubba, Barry Friedman, Andrew D. Martin, and Georg Vanberg, Who Controls the Content
of Supreme Court Opinions?, 56 Am J Polit Sci 400, 401 (2012). Of course, it’s meant as a
complement to, not a substitute for, other types of research.
150 Information about how each case was coded is on file with The University of Chicago Law Review.
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FIGURE 1: PERCENTAGE OF NINTH CIRCUIT CASE TREATMENTS,
BY YEAR
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The frequency of FOLLOW cases significantly increased and
the frequency of CONTRAVENE cases significantly decreased over
the period studied. While I had anticipated a noticeable spike in
the frequency of FOLLOW cases around 2005, when Barapind was
decided, what I in fact observed was a steady increase starting in
2002—the year after Johnson was decided. I therefore measured
the statistical significance of the change in frequency of the three
codes before and after the beginning of 2002 and found that it was
highly significant.151
The change in the Ninth Circuit’s behavior nicely illustrates
the sometimes-subtle relationship between a court’s patterns of
interpretation and its declaration of interpretive rules. The
judges I interviewed spoke as if Barapind had worked a change
151 Using a Pearson’s chi-squared test to measure the significance of the difference
between the distribution of values in the 1993–2001 period and the 2002–2013 period,
χ2(2, N = 408) = 24.9; p < 0.00001.
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to the Ninth Circuit’s jurisprudence. And at least one judge remembers voting to rehear the case en banc to effect that change.152
But the data suggest that, by 2005, a change in the way Ninth
Circuit judges distinguished between holdings and dicta was well
underway. If one believes that “the law of interpretation”153 can
slowly emerge from a “regular course of decisions,”154 then it’s possible that by the time Barapind was decided the adjudicative
model had, in a sense, already become nascent circuit law. Barapind may simply have been the first en banc panel to say so.155 On
this view, Barapind didn’t win the battle over the scope of stare
decisis so much as it memorialized the terms of surrender.
Over the period I studied, there was also a statistically significant increase in the frequency of DISTINGUISH cases.156 That
finding is consistent with the conjectures of several interviewees,
who believed their colleagues had become more likely to distinguish earlier cases after the court adopted the adjudicative
model.157 Indeed, one judge wryly remarked that the adjudicative
model hadn’t “really cramp[ed her] style” because she could often
find a way to distinguish a precedent case.158
The increase in DISTINGUISH cases shouldn’t surprise us. A
judge who seeks to circumvent an earlier case can do so in one of
three ways: (1) overrule it, (2) say that the relevant portion of the
case is dicta, or (3) distinguish the case on its facts.159 In the Ninth

152

See note 117 and accompanying text.
See generally Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev 1079 (cited in note 121).
154 Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 Va L Rev
1, 15 (2001).
155 See Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1139 (cited in note 121) (“As [legal] sources
evolve by slow accretion, . . . eventually some court will be the first to say so. . . . But . . . it’s
simply a mistake to treat this first court decision as the actual source of the underlying rule.”)
(citations omitted); A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in Legal Theory
and Legal History: Essays on the Common Law 359, 366–67 (Hambledon 1987).
156 I ran a logistic regression with DISTINGUISH as a binary dependent variable. The
time variable post-Johnson, which takes 1 if after 2001 and 0 otherwise, is a statistically
significant predictor of whether a case was assigned that code. See Appendix B. That result doesn’t change when controlling for the ideological leanings of the later panel, the
earlier panel, the interaction between the ideologies of the earlier and later panels, or the
subject matters of the cases. See id. For a description of how I determined the ideological
leanings of each panel, see Part III.D.
157 Judge A Interview (cited in note 131); Judge B Interview (cited in note 126);
Judge E Interview (cited in note 126); Judge F Interview (cited in note 117); Judge I Interview (cited in note 126); See Judge K Interview (cited in note 105); Judge N Interview
(cited in note 131).
158 Judge D Interview (cited in note 106).
159 For a discussion of the latter method of avoiding precedent, see Richard M. Re,
Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 Georgetown L J 921, 951–53 (2016);
153
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Circuit, option (1) is unavailable because three-judge panels may
not overrule prior Ninth Circuit decisions. That leaves options (2)
and (3). The adjudicative model limits the circumstances in which
a court can use option (2), which one might predict would increase
the frequency with which judges will use option (3). And that’s
what the data suggest. Nonetheless, the DISTINGUISH cases don’t
simply replace the cases that would have been coded CONTRAVENE
under the necessity model. Indeed, as explained more fully below,
the increase in FOLLOW cases alone was highly significant, suggesting that a substitution of CONTRAVENE cases for DISTINGUISH
cases isn’t the whole story.
C. Comparison with Other Circuits
The timing of the increase in cases coded FOLLOW suggests
that change may have had something to do with the Johnson decision. There are, however, other possible explanations. The
change, for example, may have been due to a structural or jurisprudential shift happening across the federal courts around 2001.
To test this possibility, I performed the same coding exercise
on cases from two control circuits, which both follow the necessity
model.160 Because a court’s propensity to follow precedent may be
a function of its internal norms and culture, I chose the Second
Circuit—a court with a reputation for collegiality and strict adherence to precedent. A court’s propensity to follow precedent
could also be a function of the size and nature of its docket. I
therefore selected the Fifth Circuit because, like the Ninth Circuit, it has a large docket with a relatively high number of criminal and immigration appeals.161 An increase in FOLLOW cases in

Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 Colum L Rev 1861, 1867–
74 (2014); Aziz Z. Huq, Removal as a Political Question, 65 Stan L Rev 1, 19 (2013); Barry
Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 Georgetown L J 1, 32–33 (2010); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in
Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 Geo Wash L Rev 68, 98–109 (1991).
160 See, for example, Baraket v Holder, 632 F3d 56, 59 (2d Cir 2011) (“[I]t is not substantive discussion of a question or lack thereof that distinguishes holding from dictum,
but rather whether resolution of the question is necessary for the decision of the case.”);
Ackerson v Bean Dredging LLC, 589 F3d 196, 205 (5th Cir 2009) (“[T]he court’s statements
. . . were unnecessary . . . and constitute nonbinding dicta.”). My sample included 314 decisions from the Second Circuit and 275 decisions from the Fifth Circuit.
161 During the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2013, for example, the Fifth
and Ninth Circuits disposed of 4,634 and 8,158 cases on the merits, respectively. In that
year, their respective criminal dockets contained 1,869 and 1,208 decisions on the merits.
For comparison, the Tenth Circuit disposed of 1,461 cases on the merits, 380 of which were

2020]

The Adjudicative Model of Precedent

1581

either circuit would suggest the change observed in the Ninth Circuit wasn’t solely the product of the adjudicative model. But the
frequency of FOLLOW cases didn’t significantly change in the Second or Fifth Circuit, suggesting the change in the Ninth Circuit
wasn’t the product of some force influencing all of the federal circuit courts.
D. Controlling for Case Type and Panel Ideology
The increase in FOLLOW cases in the Ninth Circuit could also
be the product of selection effects related to the subject matters of
or the ideological leanings of the judges assigned to the cases in
the dataset.162 Perhaps judges are more likely to follow precedent
in, say, immigration cases; or perhaps conservatives (or liberals)
are more likely to meticulously follow precedent; or perhaps
judges are more likely to follow precedents written by ideologically similar judges.163 If any of these correlations holds, then the
change I observed in the Ninth Circuit could have been influenced
by a related selection bias.

criminal cases. Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2013 (United States Courts, 2013),
archived at https://perma.cc/F8FN-TXX4.
162 Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1821 (cited in note 18). Political scientists have established
that judicial ideology (often called “attitudinal preferences”) is a significant extralegal influence on judicial decision-making. See, for example, Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J.
Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited 86–97 (Cambridge 2002);
Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model 81–
83 (Cambridge 1993); Lindquist and Cross, 80 NYU L Rev at 1178 (cited in note 145);
Frank B. Cross, Political Science and the New Legal Realism: A Case of Unfortunate Interdisciplinary Ignorance, 92 Nw U L Rev 251, 265, 275–79 (1997); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 Just Sys J 219,
224–29 (1999); Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn, and Jeffrey A. Segal,
Ideology and the Study of Judicial Behavior, in Jon Hanson, ed, Ideology, Psychology, and
Law 705, 705–06 (Oxford 2012); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa M. Ellman, Andres
Sawicki, Are Judges Political? An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary vii (Brookings Institution 2006); Max M. Schanzenbach and Emerson H. Tiller, Reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines: Judicial Politics, Empirical Evidence, and Reform, 75 U Chi L Rev
715, 732–36 (2008); Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U Chi L Rev 761, 776–84 (2008). Some scholarship, however, suggests that
political ideology “may interfere with . . . the law less in the lower [federal appellate] courts
than in the U.S. Supreme Court.” Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1821 (cited in note 18). See
Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, The New Legal Realism, 75 U Chi L Rev 831, 844
(2008); Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 Cal L
Rev 1457, 1479–82 (2003); Thomas J. Miles and Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U Chi L Rev 823, 859–63 (2006).
163 One judge said in the interviews that, if she is considering a ruling “from an ideologue on the [court’s other] wing, [she] will treat the rul[ing] with a grain of salt.” Judge N
Interview (cited in note 131).
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To investigate this possibility, I collected additional data on
the subject matters of and the ideological leanings of the judges
assigned to each case in the dataset.164 Using a logistic regression
analysis, I then determined whether either case type or ideology
was a significant predictor of whether a case was coded FOLLOW.
Neither case type nor single panel ideology was a significant predictor.165 In other words, I didn’t find evidence that liberals or conservatives are more likely to follow precedent in the abstract or
that judges are more likely to follow precedent in particular types
of cases.166
By contrast, the relationship between the ideology of the later
court and the ideology of the earlier court was a significant predictor of whether a case was coded DISTINGUISH. A panel’s propensity to distinguish a precedent correlates with the relationship
between its political leanings and the political valence of the precedent. That finding won’t surprise legal realists, since it suggests
that one good predictor of whether a panel will look for ways to
circumvent an earlier statement of law is whether the panel is
ideologically similar to the court that authored the earlier statement.167
Notwithstanding that finding, the timing of a decision relative to Johnson remained a highly significant predictor of
164 For the case types, I used Westlaw’s subject-matter categorization. I first determined
which case categories were represented in at least forty of the cases in the dataset. There
were four such categories: (1) criminal; (2) immigration; (3) employment and labor; and
(4) corporate governance. I then recorded whether each case fell within those categories.
For judicial ideology, I used the Judicial Common Space (JCS). The JCS is a database
for estimating the ideology of federal appellate judges and justices. See generally Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin, Jeffrey A. Segal, and Chad Westerland, The Judicial Common
Space, 23 J L Econ & Org 303 (2007). Where a panel included a visiting federal district
court judge, I used Professor Christina L. Boyd’s data on district court judges developed
using the same methodology as the JCS. See Christina L. Boyd, Federal District Court
Judge Ideology Data (2015), archived at https://perma.cc/LZT2-5253. I was unable to obtain JCS scores for a handful of judges whose permanent positions are on a court for which
there is no JCS data—such as the US Court of International Trade. For those judges, I
averaged the JCS scores of the two other panel members. Finally, three of the earlier cases
were decided before the earliest year for which there is JCS data. For those cases, I used
the median score of all Ninth Circuit judges as of the time of this writing.
165 The regression table is produced in Appendix A.
166 Appendix B does suggest, however, that conservative judges were less likely to
distinguish earlier cases and that criminal cases were less likely to be distinguished in my
sample.
167 Nor will it surprise some of the judges I interviewed. See Judge N Interview (cited
in note 131) (“[W]hether [a judge] want[s] to be bound by well-considered dictum depends
a lot on the composition of the court [she is] dealing with.”); Judge P Interview (cited in
note 131) (“Maybe some of the reason that people have liked th[e Barapind] rule is that
they have liked the dicta.”).
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whether a case was coded FOLLOW even after controlling for ideology. The analysis thus ruled out the possibility that the change
in the Ninth Circuit’s decision-making was merely the product of
selection bias related to the subject matters of or the judges assigned to the cases in my dataset. Indeed, the predicted probability that the average case would be coded FOLLOW (that is, when
holding the ideology-related variables at their means) increased
by 19 percentage points after Johnson was decided.
Over the period I studied and in cases involving disputes over
the holding/dictum distinction, the Ninth Circuit became substantially more likely to follow its earlier statements of law and
slightly more likely to distinguish its earlier cases. Those changes
in the court’s behavior correlate with a change in the circuit’s
stare decisis jurisprudence that the judges I interviewed regard
as significant. Further, several plausible competing explanations
for the change that I observed have been ruled out.
These facts, of course, don’t allow one to make causal claims.
Most notably, the adoption of the adjudicative model isn’t exogenous. The actors who chose to change the circuit’s stare decisis
framework are the very same actors that applied it in the cases I
studied. It’s therefore possible that the circuit’s adoption of the
adjudicative model and the change I observed in the Ninth Circuit’s behavior aren’t cause and effect but are rather both the effects of a common cause.168 This limitation is significant, but it
was inherent to the question I sought to answer and was therefore
unavoidable. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit is just one court and
accordingly doesn’t hold all the answers for thinking about how
the scope of precedent could affect other appellate courts. Consequently, one must be cautious about extrapolating from the findings of this Part to conclusions about how other courts would behave if they adopted the adjudicative model. Still, the
quantitative analysis does have some “cash-value.”169 It provides

168 There are, however, a few contrary indications. First, as noted, several of the interviewees reported that the adjudicative model has influenced the way they have decided
some cases, and some even had pending cases that fit that description. See notes 136–37.
Second, all but one of the judges who initially disagreed with the adjudicative model eventually joined opinions that used it, giving some support to the idea that the adoption of the
doctrine changed their behavior. See note 129. Third, the Ninth Circuit has continued to
use the adjudicative model even as the membership of the court has changed, suggesting
that its use wasn’t simply the product of the particular personalities that happened to
occupy the court in the early 2000s.
169 See William N. Eskridge Jr, Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U Chi L Rev 671, 676 n 11 (1999) (“To have a cash-value, evidence does not
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some evidence, and should raise our confidence, that a court will
more frequently follow, and may more frequently distinguish, its
precedent when using the adjudicative model rather than the necessity model.
That tentative finding is partly realist and partly formalist.
The data suggest that some judges began distinguishing earlier
cases more frequently after the court adopted the adjudicative
model. In other words, after the adjudicative model thwarted the
strategy of relegating certain earlier statements of law to the status of nonbinding dictum, they found another way of circumventing earlier statements they didn’t like. It also showed that Ninth
Circuit judges were more likely to follow precedents authored by
ideologically similar judges. In fact, interviewees admitted to me
that the adjudicative model doesn’t typically stand in their way
when they really want to reach a particular outcome.
But the data also present a hopeful story about the efficacy of
legal rules. When the court changed the rules for determining the
law established by earlier cases, the judges on the Ninth Circuit
appear to have changed the way they did so, at least in the minerun of cases. And that finding will likely surprise those who think
that doctrinal rules don’t influence the reasoning of courts.
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
How should we think about the adjudicative model from a
normative perspective? Is it better than the necessity model?
While a complete normative assessment of the adjudicative model
is beyond the scope of this Article, this Part explains two crosscutting implications of the model that are important for such an
assessment.
On one hand, the adjudicative model promotes the law’s clarity by making the test for determining a case’s holding more
straightforward and by broadening the set of propositions that
qualify as binding law. On the other hand, the adjudicative model
creates an incentive for judges to reach out to resolve issues more
quickly, which may diminish the quality of individual legal rules
and increase the influence of a court’s outliers. Ultimately, the
advisedness of the adjudicative model depends greatly on the institutional features of the court in which it is used. And that’s

have to dispel all doubt; a story that changes my probability assessment from 35 percent
to 40 percent has a significant cash-value.”).
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because features such as a court’s size, decision-making processes, and the nature of its docket can amplify or mitigate the
adjudicative model’s relative costs and benefits vis-à-vis the necessity model.
A. Clarity of Case Law
The adjudicative model tends to clarify the content of a
court’s case law. This is so for two reasons.
First, the adjudicative model provides a more rule-like definition of a case’s holding than the necessity model. Accordingly,
it provides a definition whose application is less likely to be the
subject of plausible disagreement among judges.170 That’s an improvement over the necessity model, which (as Part I illustrated)
is the source of regular and substantial disagreement in the federal courts.
Increasing the consistency with which a court goes about determining the content of its case law entails several subsidiary
benefits. For starters, it reduces judicial doublespeak about the
content of the law, which in turn promotes a court’s perceived
neutrality. Litigants with similar claims and arguments expect
that their cases will be decided under the same legal standards.171
When a court takes an inconsistent approach to interpreting its
own case law, it feeds the narrative that judges often choose the
approach that allows them to reach particular outcomes—that
judging resembles looking over the crowd and picking out one’s
friends.172 It’s therefore not “healthy,” as one judge observed, for
a court to state a principle for determining the holding of a case
only to say in the next case, “[W]ell, we can just ignore that.”173 By
contrast, when a court applies legal standards more consistently
across cases, it acts as if the law is more than what a majority of

170 Before conducting my case study of the Ninth Circuit, I thought litigation over
whether a statement was necessary for the outcome of an earlier case may simply morph
into litigation over whether a particular issue had been “decided by” or “part of” an earlier
case. But in the 408 cases in my dataset, I saw very little disagreement over whether
issues had genuinely been decided or genuinely involved in earlier cases.
171 See Gluck, 119 Yale L J at 1767–68 (cited in note 18).
172 See Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 Iowa L Rev 195, 214 (1983) (making a similar point about
statutory interpretation methodology). See also Abramowicz and Stearns, 57 Stan L Rev
at 1024 (cited in note 1) (“As the distinction between holding and dicta becomes increasingly vague, past precedents can be increasingly manipulated.”).
173 Judge D Interview (cited in note 106).
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judges say it is at any one moment,174 and thus promotes the perception that the court is a “disinterested interpreter” of the law.175
By providing a more consistent approach to determining the
content of a court’s case law, the adjudicative model also enhances
the law’s predictability. If a party doesn’t know which test a court
will use to determine the holding of a precedent case, it may be
difficult to predict how the precedent will affect her case. Consider, for example, President Obama’s perspective before Windsor. As noted, he hoped the courts would hold DOMA unconstitutional. The question was whether to direct the Justice
Department to advance that position in court. While that approach aligned with the president’s view on the merits, it posed
the risk of depriving the federal courts of Article III jurisdiction
and thus the opportunity to opine on the statute’s constitutionality. The Supreme Court had offered guidance on the Article III
issue in Chadha, but its inconsistent methodology for determining the scope of its own case law made Chadha’s significance uncertain. Indeed, three justices believed Chadha hadn’t established binding law on the question of Article III adversity.176 And
if two more had agreed, the president’s goal of positioning the
Court to hold DOMA unconstitutional could have been thwarted.
Second, the adjudicative model promotes the law’s clarity by
expanding the set of prior statements that must be treated as authoritative. Under the necessity model, a court may not establish
law except to the extent that doing so is necessary to reach a
case’s outcome. Any issue of law will therefore be resolved by the
first court to confront it in a case that requires its resolution. The
adjudicative model, by contrast, gives courts discretion to resolve
an issue in any case where it’s raised. As a consequence, the adjudicative model can remove questions “from the sphere of reasonable debate” more quickly than the necessity model.177 As one
judge said, because the adjudicative model “provides guiding law
for more than just the issues that were essential or elemental to

174 Judge M Interview (cited in note 99) (noting that the adjudicative model made the
Ninth Circuit act more like a court). As noted, this was why some judges initially voted for
the adjudicative model and prefer it to this day.
175 Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The “Art” of Overruling, 1963 S Ct Rev 211,
218. See also Earl M. Maltz, Some Thoughts on the Death of Stare Decisis in Constitutional
Law, 1980 Wis L Rev 467, 484. Precedent is often thought to promote neutrality. See Monaghan, 88 Colum L Rev at 752 (cited in note 3); Cross, 92 Nw U L Rev at 262 (cited in note 162);
Neil Duxbury, The Nature and Authority of Precedent 170 (Cambridge 2008).
176 Windsor, 570 US at 783–84 (Scalia dissenting).
177 Kozel, 113 Mich L Rev at 205 (cited in note 11).
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the case[,] . . . [courts] have more law to apply.”178 The model can
thus help parties better understand their legal rights and obligations and thereby avoid litigation.179
This benefit can be seen most clearly, though by no means
exclusively, in areas where the clarity of the law is a condition for
providing relief. Some circuit courts, for instance, won’t find
“plain error” unless a trial court violated the holding of an earlier
case.180 Similarly, federal habeas petitioners and plaintiffs in
cases brought under § 1983 can prevail in their cases only if a
ruling in their favor is compelled by clearly established law.181 The
speed with which judicial case law crystallizes the content of the
law can thus be vitally important, even in matters of life and
death.182

178 Judge B Interview (cited in note 126). See also Judge N Interview (cited in
note 131). Along similar lines, Professor John C. Jeffries Jr has argued that one benefit of
the Supreme Court’s qualified immunity jurisprudence is that it allows judges to announce
the existence of constitutional rights even in cases where the judges don’t want to provide
a remedy to the criminal defendant. See John C. Jeffries Jr, The Right-Remedy Gap in
Constitutional Law, 109 Yale L J 87, 93–95 (1999).
179 The drive toward clarity, however, is likely not uniform throughout all areas of the
law. Depending on the texture and contours of a court’s existing jurisprudence, the adjudicative model may obfuscate its case law by exacerbating legal “gluts”—that is, areas of
the law where the proliferation of decisions has made it more difficult for a lawyer to determine how the law applies to her client’s cases. Indeed, one judge speculated that the
adjudicative model may have led to a few specific lines of circuit law that she thinks are
in considerable tension. See Judge F Interview (cited in note 117).
180 See United States v Whren, 111 F3d 956, 960–61 (DC Cir 1997) (“[I]t is not a plain
error for a trial court not to follow a mere dictum of the court of appeals.”); United States
v Segura, 747 F3d 323, 330 (5th Cir 2014) (similar). When reviewing for plain error, a
court of appeals may not reverse a lower court unless it made an error that was “clear or
obvious.” Puckett v United States, 556 US 129, 135 (2009); United States v Olano, 507 US
725, 734 (1993).
181 In § 1983 cases, an officer may not be held liable unless the officer’s conduct violated “clearly established law.” See White v Pauly, 137 S Ct 548, 551–52 (2017). In federal
habeas cases, petitioners are entitled to relief only if they can show that they were tried
in violation of a federal constitutional right that was clearly established by a holding of
the US Supreme Court at the time of the violation. See Williams v Taylor, 529 US 362,
412 (2000); 28 USC § 2254(d)(1).
182 In its 2014 decision in White v Woodall, 572 US 415 (2014), for instance, the Supreme Court divided over whether Estelle v Smith, 451 US 454 (1981), had held that the
same procedural protections required in the guilt phase of a criminal trial are also required in the penalty phase of a capital-murder trial. White, 572 US at 420–24. Three
justices concluded that it had. Id at 428–29 (Breyer dissenting). They therefore believed
the trial judge’s failure to admonish the jury not to draw adverse inferences from Robert
Woodall’s decision not to testify in the penalty phase entitled Woodall to a new trial, potentially sparing him from the death penalty. Id at 428. But the other six justices believed
Estelle’s statement was dicta and therefore concluded the petitioner’s death sentence
should stand. Id at 423–24 (majority).
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B. Quality of Case Law
While the adjudicative model may increase the law’s clarity, it
may also reduce the law’s quality. This is again for two reasons.183
First, by increasing the speed with which case law develops,
the adjudicative model may make courts less likely to arrive at
efficient rules. A court that resolves an issue earlier in time will
have less information.184 All else being equal, we should therefore
expect the court to develop lower-quality legal rules than if it had
decided the issue later in time. Moreover, decisions are less likely
to be revised under the adjudicative model because unnecessary
rulings are unlikely to be appealed,185 and because, in future
cases, a later court cannot simply relegate an unwise statement
of law to the status of nonbinding dictum.186 Many errors will thus
go uncorrected due to the law’s inherent path dependence.187
Second, the adjudicative model may reduce the law’s quality
by increasing the relative influence of a court’s jurisprudential
outliers, thus making the law less representative of the judicial
mainstream. To see this, begin by noticing that the adjudicative
model, like all rules of precedent, allocates power within the judiciary.188 In particular, as compared to the necessity model, it shifts
power to courts acting earlier in time and takes power away from
courts acting later in time.

183 Of course, to say that the adjudicative model will lower the average quality of a
court’s individual rules isn’t to say that the corpus of a court’s case law will be worse as a
whole at any given moment. The benefits of establishing well-functioning rules earlier in
time must be weighed against the cost of a lower average quality of rules.
184 See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case At a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme
Court 3–4 (Harvard 1999); Christopher J. Peters, Assessing the New Judicial Minimalism,
100 Colum L Rev 1454, 1520 (2000) (“Narrow judicial decisionmaking . . . is defensible . . .
as a means of reducing the risk of judicial error.”); Nelson, 87 Va L Rev at 59 (cited in note
154) (“[L]ater courts often have the benefit of experience; they have more information
about how the rule chosen by their predecessors has worked in practice.”).
185 See Leval, 81 NYU L Rev at 1262 (cited in note 3).
186 See Neal Devins and David Klein, The Vanishing Common Law Judge?, 165 U Pa
L Rev 595, 606 (2017) (“[W]hen [ ] courts take an expansive view of precedent, they have
a reduced ability to propose refinements to legal doctrine or to slow the pace at which it
grows and solidifies.”). See also Dorf, 142 U Pa L Rev at 2053 (cited in note 9) (noting that
critics of his more “wooden” approach to precedent prefer an “imprecise holding/dictum
distinction [which] permits [a later court] to bend precedent without breaking it”).
187 See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 Iowa L Rev 601, 622–25 (2001); Lee, 78 NC L
Rev at 654 (cited in note 77).
188 See Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of RuleBased Decision-Making in Law and in Life 182–83 (Oxford 1991) (observing that rules of
precedent allocate authority between courts across time).
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This feature of the model will tend to amplify a judge’s opinion-writing proclivities. In particular, it will tend to make the
minimalist judge write more cautiously and the maximalist judge
write more ambitiously.189 In the interviews, one judge said the
Barapind framework makes her write cautious opinions because,
“if [the court] do[es] reach a question, it cannot [later] be dismissed as dicta.”190 On the other hand, for the judge who seeks to
imprint her political preferences on the law, the adjudicative
model creates an incentive to reach out to decide as many issues
as possible as broadly as possible. Several interviewees said the
adjudicative model may encourage “strategic judge[s]” to “do more
than [they] ha[ve] to do” when they “ha[ve] the votes.”191 One said
that the adjudicative model “encourages judges to lay down a
whole bunch of law[ ] as if [the court] were Congress writing the
healthcare bill.”192 And several mentioned the late Judge Stephen
Reinhardt as someone for whom the adjudicative model was “an
arrow in the quiver.”193 As one colorfully put it: “People would ask
me, ‘What’s wrong with [the Ninth Circuit’s] assignment system—Judge Reinhardt is on all the big cases?’ [And] I . . . say, . . .

189 In this respect, the adjudicative model is related to the large literature on judicial
minimalism. See generally Sunstein, One Case at a Time (cited in note 184); Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv L Rev 4 (1996); Peters, 100 Colum
L Rev 1454 (cited in note 184); Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the
Balance Between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 Va L Rev 1753 (2004);
Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 Stan L Rev 1709 (1998); Tara Leigh Grove,
The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 Cornell L Rev 1 (2009).
190 Judge F Interview (cited in note 117). See also Erin O’Hara, Social Constraint or
Implicit Collusion?: Toward a Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare Decisis, 24 Seton Hall L
Rev 736, 741 & n 19 (1993) (suggesting that a judge’s limited ability to anticipate the consequences of overly broad holdings might provide an incentive to limit ambitious judicial
opinions); Farber, 90 Minn L Rev at 1179 (cited in note 9) (noting that the common law
imposes “discipline [ ] on decision making by the knowledge that a decision will function
as a precedent”).
191 Judge C Interview (cited in note 136). See also Judge A Interview (cited in
note 131) (explaining that “if you have strong views on what the law should be in an area
. . . it is quite tempting to write things that are not essential to the holding . . . that [ ]
nonetheless will be viewed or arguably will be viewed as binding later”); Leval, 81 NYU L
Rev at 1263–64 (cited in note 3) (noting that judges sometimes try to “preempt colleagues
who might later decide [an] issue in a manner not to [their] liking”). But see Judge L
Interview (cited in note 131) (“[Initially,] I thought, if we had that kind of rule, people are
going to go out of their way to say things that are dicta, but they are going to be seriously
treated. But I haven’t seen too much of that.”).
192 Judge H Interview (cited in note 126).
193 Judge E Interview (cited in note 126); Judge M Interview (cited in note 99);
Judge N Interview (cited in note 131).
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‘There is nothing wrong with [our] assignment system—Judge
Reinhardt makes big cases!’” 194
Further, the judges most inclined to write broadly on particular issues may also tend to be outliers on those issues. Assuming
a normal distribution of judicial preferences, an outlier judge will
have fewer opportunities to sit with other judges of similar sensibilities and preferences, so she may feel increased pressure to
seize rare opportunities to wield the majority pen.
C. Context Sensitivity
Given the relative costs and benefits discussed in the previous two Sections, should the rest of the federal appellate courts
adopt the adjudicative model? And if not, should the Ninth Circuit
fall back in line with the rest? Reasonable minds can disagree
about the answers to those questions, and the relevant considerations ultimately depend on a particular court’s institutional features. That’s because those features amplify the adjudicative
model’s costs and benefits.
To begin, the clarity of a court’s definition of a holding is more
valuable in large courts that regularly hear cases in randomly
drawn panels than in small courts or in courts that always hear
cases en banc. As the size of a court that hears cases in panels
increases, so does the probability that a later panel will be ideologically dissimilar to the panel that decided a relevant precedent
and thus so does the incentive for the later court to manipulate
the holding/dictum distinction to avoid the precedent.195 By contrast, the value of a rule-like definition of a holding is diminished
in courts that always hear cases en banc because such courts exhibit greater consistency of personnel from case to case. As one
194 Judge F Interview (cited in note 117) (emphasis added). One can’t help but notice
that another extremely vocal judge—Judge Kozinski—was the author of the separate opinion in Johnson that first launched the circuit down this path. It’s thus possible, as one
judge speculated, to view the adjudicative model as a kind of “truce” among judicial maximalists in which they would “let each other” “writ[e] dicta intentionally and then build[ ]
on it.” Judge P Interview (cited in note 131).
195 See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Disorder in the Court (LA Times, July 11, 2007), archived
at https://perma.cc/6L29-VNNF. See also D.H. Kaye, On a Mathematical Argument for
Splitting the Ninth Circuit, 48 Jurimetrics 329, 332–33 (2008) (agreeing that increasing
the size of a circuit increases the chance of outlier judges constituting a panel majority);
Abramowicz and Stearns, 57 Stan L Rev at 1009–10 (cited in note 1) (noting that “panels
are the product of random draws of three among a larger set of members of the court. The
randomness exacerbates the problem of doctrinal instability by increasing the probability
that panels that do not represent accurately the membership of the court as a whole will
decide cases”).
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judge said in the interviews, “The danger of a big circuit . . . is
that you don’t have the kind of continuity that” smaller courts
have.196
Much the same may be true of a court’s geographical dispersity and informal norms of collegiality. Judges on the DC Circuit,
for example, see one another far more frequently than judges on,
say, the Eighth Circuit, which includes states as far north as
North Dakota and as far south as Arkansas. As a consequence,
informal modes of social influence may create greater consistency
from panel to panel.
The size and nature of a court’s docket also affects the magnitude of the adjudicative model’s relative costs and benefits.197
The clarity of a court’s preexisting legal rules is more valuable
when applied to a docket dominated by large numbers of routine
appeals than it is applied to a docket dominated by a small number of normatively complex cases of first impression.198 Similarly,
the cost of reaching suboptimal legal rules is reduced to the extent
that those rules are created largely at the interstices of wellestablished doctrine and is magnified to the extent the court regularly decides issues of great national significance. Sometimes “it
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right,”199 and sometimes the opposite is true.
A related consideration is how likely a court’s decisions are to
be corrected—either by rehearing at the same court or on review
by a higher court. The more that a court’s decisions are subject to
additional layers of review, the more that it can afford the possibility of additional error. As one judge said in the interviews, one
reason why Ninth Circuit judges largely aren’t bothered by the
breadth of judicial power under the adjudicative model is that the

196

Judge D Interview (cited in note 106).
See Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101
Mich L Rev 885, 890–913 (2003) (arguing that statutory interpretation practices should
take institutional resources and capacities into account); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchy and Heterogeneity: How to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 Cornell L Rev 433, 470
(2012) (similar).
198 Insofar as the adjudicative model helps courts deal with large numbers of cases
more efficiently, it is of a piece with other changes to the rules of precedent, such as the
rule that three-judge panels may not overrule the decisions of other three-judge panels,
see Miller v Gammie, 335 F3d 889, 899–900 (9th Cir 2003) (en banc), or the rule allowing
courts to issue nonprecedential opinions, see Hart v Massanari, 266 F3d 1155, 1163 (9th
Cir 2001).
199 Burnet v Coronado Oil & Gas Co, 285 US 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting).
197
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court’s relatively active en banc practice allows the court a “way
to fix” decisions when “judges [ ] go really out of their lane.”200
Reasonable minds can disagree about how the foregoing considerations are best balanced in any particular court. But one conclusion seems fairly clear: the adjudicative model is better suited
to large, intermediate appellate courts, like the Ninth Circuit,
than to small appellate courts, especially those that have a regular diet of blockbuster cases of first impression, like the DC Circuit and the Supreme Court.
Of all the federal appellate courts, the Ninth Circuit has the
largest number of judges regularly hearing cases,201 it receives the
highest number of visiting judges,202 and it has the greatest degree of geographical dispersity. These facts suggest that the
Ninth Circuit is in particular need of rules of precedent that will
promote consistency between randomly assigned three-judge panels.203 As noted, the circuit also has a robust en banc practice for
correcting the errors of three-judge panels.204 And while the circuit does issue its share of consequential rulings, the mine-run of
cases are the numerous criminal and immigration appeals that
require the court’s careful attention but that, on average, don’t
generate much by way of new circuit law. Thus, more than any

200 Judge K Interview (cited in note 105). See also Abramowicz and Stearns, 57 Stan
L Rev at 1010 (cited in note 1) (“En banc review protects against panel decisions that
threaten over time to move doctrine away from the general preferences of the court as a
whole.”).
201 As of the time of writing, the circuit has twenty-nine active judgeships and nineteen judges with senior status.
202 In 2017, for example, the circuit received over sixty visiting judges who sat during
approximately two hundred argument days. See Judges Help Judges When Courts Face
Heavy Caseloads (United States Courts, Nov 8, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/9MRS
-W7UX.
203 See Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice
of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U Chi L Rev 541, 544–47 (1989); Arthur D.
Hellman, Maintaining Consistency in the Law of the Large Circuit, in Arthur D. Hellman,
ed, Restructuring Justice: The Innovations of the Ninth Circuit and the Future of the Federal Courts 55, 56 (Cornell 1990).
204 See Alexandra Sadinsky, Redefining En Banc Review in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 82 Fordham L Rev 2001, 2015 n 128 (2014). The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit
court in which less than the full court may sit to hear a case en banc. The parties may
petition for the full court to rehear a case decided by an eleven-judge panel in what is
sometimes called a “super en banc.” See Elizabeth I. Winston, Differentiating the Federal
Circuit, 76 Mo L Rev 813, 821 n 45 (2011); 9th Cir R 35-3.
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other circuit, the Ninth Circuit’s modus operandi isn’t an idealized form of “[j]udicial deliberation” but rather the efficient resolution of cases with “reasonable dispatch.”205
Now, contrast the Ninth Circuit with the Supreme Court and
the DC Circuit: The Supreme Court is small and geographically
concentrated, its membership is highly stable, it always sits en
banc, and it hears fewer cases per year than any other federal
court. Further, its docket consists mostly of difficult cases involving issues over which the federal circuit courts have already disagreed, and it sits at the apex of the federal judiciary, where there
is no possibility of further review by another court. Much the
same is true of the DC Circuit. That court is relatively small,206
geographically concentrated, and has a smaller docket than the
other federal circuit courts.207 Moreover, as a function of statutes
giving it exclusive appellate jurisdiction over certain matters involving the federal government, the circuit hears a regular diet of
difficult, blockbuster cases affecting the entire country. Because
of these features, the Supreme Court and the DC Circuit are in
great need of rules of precedent that will tend to produce higherquality decisions and in less need of rules that aim to improve
consistency between different panels of the same court.208 Accordingly, they are less well suited to the adjudicative model than a
court like the Ninth Circuit.
Notice, however, that these are contingent features of each of
these courts. The Supreme Court today has a relatively small

205 Richard A. Posner, The Role of the Judge in the Twenty-First Century, 86 BU L
Rev 1049, 1051, 1053 (2006).
206 As of the time of writing, the circuit has only eleven active judgeships and seven
judges with senior status.
207 During the twelve-month period ending March 31, 2013, for example, the DC Circuit disposed of only 637 cases on the merits. See Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics
2013 (cited in note 161).
208 See Grove, 95 Cornell L Rev at 22 (cited in note 189) (“Because the [Supreme]
Court has almost complete control over its docket, it can spend more time on each case
than a court of appeals with mandatory appellate jurisdiction or a single district court
judge, who may process several hundred cases in a given year.”) (citations omitted). This
assertion isn’t necessarily in tension with the conclusion of several scholars that, in the
vertical context, the Supreme Court may need “to stretch the definition of holding given
the Court’s unique role in judicial administration.” Abramowicz and Stearns, 57 Stan L
Rev at 1067 (cited in note 1). See also Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of
State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 Ind L J 335, 358–59 (2002). It’s possible that
a broad conception of precedent is appropriate for lower courts interpreting the decisions
of the Supreme Court, but that a narrow conception is appropriate when the Supreme
Court interprets its own decisions.
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docket because the Court has discretion over the cases that it accepts, and today’s justices have chosen to grant certiorari sparingly. But if Congress so desired, it could choose to give the Supreme Court mandatory appellate jurisdiction over a large
number of relatively straightforward appeals and thereby reduce
the significance of the average Supreme Court case.209 Similarly,
the Court today always hears cases en banc and is composed of
nine justices who serve exclusively on the Supreme Court. But
these too are contingent institutional features. Scholars have proposed to increase the size of the Supreme Court,210 to require it to
sit in panels,211 and to compose it of judges who split their time
between the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals.212 Adopting
any of these proposals would increase the Court’s need for a rule
of precedent that aims to maintain consistency across panels of
the Court and would thus make the adjudicative model more attractive than it currently is.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS
I have thus far assumed that the adjudicative model is constitutional, but is it?213 Article III provides: “The judicial Power of
209 US Const Art III, § 2 (“In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court
shall have appellate Jurisdiction, . . . with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make.”).
210 See Jonathan Turley, A Bigger, Better Supreme Court: The Case for Reform (The
Guardian, June 27, 2012) (proposing a nineteen-justice Supreme Court), archived at
https://perma.cc/9NYU-VM48; Jacob Hale Russell, The Supreme Court Doesn’t Need 9 Justices. It Needs 27 (Time, July 16, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/M5VN-PLHW; Tracey
E. George and Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme Court in the Courts’
of Appeals Image, 58 Duke L J 1439, 1454–58 (2009) (recommending a fifteen-justice Supreme Court).
211 See George and Guthrie, 58 Duke L J at 1458–65 (cited in note 210). See generally
Tracey E. George and Chris Guthrie, “The Threes”: Re-Imagining Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 61 Vand L Rev 1825 (2008). Several state high courts, such as those in Arizona, Connecticut, Nevada, and Texas, routinely sit in panels of less than the full court.
212 See Daniel Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 Yale
L J 148, 181–92 (2019).
213 State courts aren’t subject to Article III’s requirements. See Jack L. Landau, State
Constitutionalism and the Limits of Judicial Power, 69 Rutgers L Rev 1309, 1311 (2017);
Helen Hershkoff, States Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 Harv L Rev 1833, 1842–75 (2001); F. Andrew Hessick, Cases, Controversies, and
Diversity, 109 Nw U L Rev 57, 65–75 (2015). See also William A. Fletcher, The “Case or
Controversy” Requirement in State Court Adjudication of Federal Questions, 78 Cal L Rev
263, 294–95 (1990) (arguing Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement should apply in
state courts when interpreting federal law). The objections explored here are therefore not
generally applicable to the state courts. Several states’ justiciability doctrine, however,
mirrors that of the federal courts. See Landau, 69 Rutgers L Rev at 1314 (cited in
note 213). The conclusions in the main text will therefore have relevance to those states.
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the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in
such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”214 This power, it continues, “shall extend” to
certain types of “Cases” and “Controversies.”215 These provisions,
and the interpretive gloss the Supreme Court has given them,
suggest several objections to the adjudicative model. First, the
model may violate Article III, if the Vesting Clause is construed
to incorporate a traditional conception of the judicial function.
Second, perhaps the adjudicative model may violate Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement. This Part contends that these
objections fail.216
A. “Judicial Power”
One argument against the adjudicative model is that it violates a traditional conception of the judicial power. According to
many historians, the modern doctrine of stare decisis—under
which a single case may bind future courts—is an invention of the
nineteenth century and therefore wasn’t firmly established until
well after the Founding.217 Instead, early American courts had a
narrower understanding of precedent, according to which only a
214

US Const Art III, § 1.
US Const Art III, § 2.
216 A third objection doesn’t argue that the adjudicative model is unconstitutional per
se; rather, it says that it’s unconstitutional for an “inferior” federal court (like the Ninth
Circuit) to use the adjudicative model because it contradicts the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning precedent. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey
Superior Court Precedents, 46 Stan L Rev 817, 828–34 (1994) (arguing the word “inferior”
in Article III implies that the lower federal courts must follow the Supreme Court’s precedent). But see John Harrison, The Power of Congress Over the Rules of Precedent, 50 Duke
L J 503, 515 (2000) (“The more plausible reading is [ ] that lower courts are inferior in that
they may be subjected to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction and are so subjected
by the Constitution’s default rule.”). This argument fails because current doctrine doesn’t
prohibit lower courts from adopting their own rules of precedent. Nor have the Supreme
Court’s statements about its own precedent been consistent enough to support an inference to that effect.
217 See, for example, Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law
350 (Little, Brown 5th ed 1956); Carleton Kemp Allen, Law in the Making 225–26 (Oxford
5th ed 1951); Frederick G. Kempin Jr, Precedent and Stare Decisis: The Critical Years,
1800 to 1850, 3 Am J Legal Hist 28, 50 (1959); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical
Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 Vand L Rev 647, 661
(1999); Jim Evans, Change in the Doctrine of Precedent During the Nineteenth Century, in
Laurence Goldstein, ed, Precedent in Law 35, 46–72 (Oxford 1987); Harold J. Berman, The
Origins of Historical Jurisprudence: Coke, Selden, Hale, 103 Yale L J 1651, 1736–38
(1994); Thomas R. Lee and Lance S. Lehnhof, The Anastasoff Case and the Judicial Power
to “Unpublish” Opinions, 77 Notre Dame L Rev 135, 166–68 (2001). But see Gerald J.
Postema, Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II), 3 Oxford U Commonwealth L J
1, 12 (2003) (arguing that stare decisis emerged in England in the late eighteenth century).
215
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series of cases could serve as presumptive evidence of the law.218
From the fact that the practice of following precedent had become
ubiquitous by the late eighteenth century, several scholars have
inferred that the founding generation would have understood Article III’s invocation of the “judicial Power” to require courts to
follow precedent.219 By parity of reasoning, perhaps Article III incorporates a traditional, narrow conception of a holding and a
common law court’s role.220 If so, the adjudicative model may be
unconstitutional because it deviates from that conception.
This argument—that the “judicial Power” implies particular
rules of precedent—rests on an implausibly narrow construction
of Article III. One cannot derive specific rules from either the present-day meaning or the original public meaning of the phrase
“judicial Power.” Nor is it plausible to think that the founding
generation believed that the Constitution had cemented the rules
of precedent then followed in American courts. Those rules were
still largely in a state of flux when the Constitution was ratified.
As Professors John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport explain, “a
diversity of precedent rules, both horizontal and vertical, [have]
governed judicial decisions both before and after the Constitution

218 See John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and
Precedent, 103 Nw U L Rev 803, 809 (2009); William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation,
71 Stan L Rev 1, 37–38 (2019); Lee, 52 Vand L Rev at 668–69 (cited in note 217). The view
was overdetermined by legal practices at the time: court reporters didn’t keep accurate
and comprehensive records of judicial decisions; courts typically issued seriatim opinions
explaining each judge’s view of the case rather than a single authoritative opinion; and
courts regarded judicial decisions as evidence of the law, not as freestanding sources of
law. See Kempin, 3 Am J Legal Hist at 31–36 (cited in note 217).
219 See McGinnis and Rappaport, 103 Nw U L Rev at 807–22 (cited in note 218); Richard W. Murphy, Separation of Powers and the Horizontal Force of Precedent, 78 Notre
Dame L Rev 1075, 1085–1101 (2003); Polly J. Price, Precedent and Judicial Power After
the Founding, 42 BC L Rev 81, 89 (2000); Fallon, 76 NYU L Rev at 579 (cited in note 77)
(“[F]amiliar sources can be adduced to suggest that ‘the judicial Power’ was understood
historically to include a power to create precedents of some degree of binding force.”); Akhil
Reed Amar, Our Forgotten Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 Yale L J 281, 294 &
n 51 (1987). But see Harrison, 50 Duke L J at 513–25 (cited in note 216) (criticizing this
conclusion); Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional Requirement, 104 W Va L
Rev 43, 88–89 (2001) (arguing that stare decisis is not dictated by the understanding of
“judicial power” as it existed at the Founding); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case
Against Precedent, 17 Harv J L & Pub Pol 23, 29–30 (1994).
220 See Anastasoff v United States, 223 F3d 898, 900 (8th Cir 2000) (advancing a similar argument against the constitutionality of federal circuit courts issuing nonprecedential opinions); Erica S. Weisberger, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 Georgetown L J 621, 633–38 (2009) (same).
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was enacted. It is hard to see how one could derive a single precedent approach from this diversity.”221 It’s therefore implausible
to read Article III to entail particular rules of precedent other
than the most general rule that the federal courts should adhere
to precedent simpliciter.
The argument also conflicts with current doctrine. Unlike Article II, which vests the “executive Power” in the president alone,
Article III vests the “judicial Power” in each of the federal courts.
If the “judicial Power” implies particular rules of precedent, Article III’s text suggests those rules should apply in every federal
court.222 But that’s not the law. Rules of precedent today vary
widely based on the level of court deciding a case. The Supreme
Court and the federal circuit courts follow horizontal precedent,
but the federal district courts have never regarded their own decisions as binding.223 At one time, the federal circuit courts largely
regarded their sister circuits’ precedents as binding, but today
they don’t.224 Three-judge panels of the circuit courts are bound by
an absolute rule of stare decisis, but circuit courts sitting en banc
are not.225 And the circuit and district courts each have rules allowing them to decide whether to issue a published opinion or a
nonprecedential memorandum disposition, but the Supreme
Court does not.226 The idea that the “judicial Power” entails particular rules of precedent would throw a wrench into many of
these rules and practices.
The varied nature of current doctrine reflects the constitutional status of rules of precedent. Instead of a fixed point of constitutional law, rules of precedent are common law, which can
221 McGinnis and Rappaport, 103 Nw U L Rev at 827 (cited in note 218) (citations
omitted). See also Lee, 52 Vand L Rev at 651 (cited in note 217) (concluding “that the
modern muddle over stare decisis has been with us since the founding era”); Norman R.
Williams, The Failings of Originalism: The Federal Courts and the Power of Precedent, 37
UC Davis L Rev 761, 803 (2004).
222 See Harrison, 50 Duke L J at 515 & n 41 (cited in note 216) (attributing a similar
observation to potential critics). But see Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in
a “Unified Judiciary”, 78 Tex L Rev 1513, 1515 (2000) (arguing that courts “enjoy somewhat different packages of judicial power . . . depending on their . . . placement” in the
“hierarchical Article III system”).
223 See Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12
Nev L J 787, 800–04 (2012); Camreta, 563 US at 709 n 7; James Wm. Moore, 18 Moore’s
Federal Practice § 134.02[1][d] (Matthew Bender 3d ed 2019).
224 See Harrison, 50 Duke L J at 516 (cited in note 216).
225 See, for example, United States v Allah, 130 F3d 33, 38 (2d Cir 1997).
226 Academic commentators have criticized the practice of issuing unpublished decisions. See, for example, Richard B. Cappalli, The Common Law’s Case Against Non-Precedential Opinions, 76 S Cal L Rev 755, 788–93 (2003).
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change to accommodate a court’s needs.227 They are “part of the
internal operating procedures of the courts”228 and should vary
based on “changes in the structure of the court system.”229 In other
words, a particular court’s rules of precedent should be sensitive
to the court’s capabilities, obligations, and institutional context.
B. “Cases” and “Controversies”
A second argument against the adjudicative model is that it
runs afoul of Article III, § 2, which provides that the federal judicial power extends to “Cases” and “Controversies.” The case-orcontroversy requirement has often been considered a key protection of our system of separated powers because it prevents the
courts from establishing new law in the comprehensive and proactive manner characteristic of statutes.230 The federal courts
have construed this clause to limit the exercise of their authority
to live, concrete disputes between adverse parties.231 A federal
court may not opine on claims that have become moot, for instance, because doing so doesn’t resolve a live dispute.232 Nor may
a federal court issue an advisory opinion (a legal declaration that
cannot affect a party’s rights) because doing so doesn’t resolve a
concrete dispute.233
One could argue that a model of precedent as broad as the
adjudicative model violates the case-or-controversy requirement
because, once a court has said enough to reach the outcome, it’s

227 See John O. McGinnis and Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution 169–72 (Harvard 2013); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by
Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 Yale L J
1535, 1540 (2000); Harrison, 50 Duke L J at 525–30 (cited in note 216); Abbe R. Gluck,
The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 Wm
& Mary L Rev 753, 768 (2013); Bayern, 36 Fla St U L Rev at 152 (cited in note 3).
228 Harrison, 50 Duke L J at 511 (cited in note 216).
229 Lee and Lehnhof, 77 Notre Dame L Rev at 166 (cited in note 217).
230 See Flast v Cohen, 392 US 83, 95 (1968) (stating that the case-or-controversy requirement ensures “the federal courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other
branches of government”); Bandes, 42 Stan L Rev at 227 (cited in note 4) (explaining that
“[t]he case requirement . . . distinguish[es] the territory of the federal courts from that of
the political branches”) (citations omitted).
231 See Robert J. Pushaw Jr, Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual
Functions of Federal Courts, 69 Notre Dame L Rev 447, 453 (1994); Landau, 69 Rutgers L
J at 1311–12 (cited in note 213); Hessick, 109 Nw U L Rev at 63 (cited in note 213); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 Tex L Rev 73, 77–78 (2007).
232 See Matthew I. Hall, The Partially Prudential Doctrine of Mootness, 77 Geo Wash
L Rev 562, 567 (2009).
233 See Fendon v Bank of America, N.A., 877 F3d 714, 716 (7th Cir 2017).
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no longer deciding a “Case.”234 Or one could argue that a model of
precedent that allows unnecessary holdings violates the prohibition on advisory opinions.235 After all, a court that could make
binding pronouncements on matters unrelated to the case before
it would have virtually the same unfettered lawmaking authority
as a legislature.
Scholars have criticized the narrowness of the Court’s justiciability doctrine on numerous grounds.236 But even if we take it
at face value, the argument goes wrong by misunderstanding the
nature of the case-or-controversy requirement. That requirement
determines whether a federal court has jurisdiction over a claim
when the court makes its decision, not whether a ruling on a claim
over which it had jurisdiction was authoritative. In other words,
it is a limitation that operates at the threshold to determine
whether the federal judicial power may be exercised at all.
Further, transforming the case-or-controversy requirement
into a way of evaluating the authority of earlier decisions would
conflict with several aspects of current federal practice. First, the
Supreme Court has held that a government official may seek appellate review of a ruling that he violated the Constitution even
where he ultimately prevailed on grounds of qualified immunity.237 In so holding, the Court rejected the argument that such
appeals “present no case or controversy.”238 Instead, the officer retains a “personal stake” in the case because the ruling “may have
prospective effect” that would force him to “change the way he
234 See Leval, 81 NYU L Rev at 1259 (cited in note 3); Michael L. Eber, Comment,
When the Dissent Creates the Law: Cross-Cutting Majorities and the Prediction Model of
Precedent, 58 Emory L J 207, 230–31 (2008); Klein and Devins, 54 Wm & Mary L Rev at
2027–28 (cited in note 145); Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 NC L Rev 847, 919–20 (2005).
235 See Williams, 69 Stan L Rev at 846–47 (cited in note 3); Eric Rasmusen, Judicial
Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J L Econ & Org 63, 75 (1994); Alan J. Meese, Reinventing Bakke, 1 Green Bag 2d 381, 382 (1998) (describing dicta as “the functional equivalent of an advisory opinion”); Killian, 41 Pepperdine L Rev at 9 (cited in note 85) (arguing
that “[d]icta is, at bottom, a form of advisory opinion”).
236 See Stewart Jay, Most Humble Servants: The Advisory Role of Early Judges 171–
77 (Yale 1997); Pushaw, 69 Notre Dame L Rev at 447–48 (cited in note 231); Steven L.
Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 Stan L Rev
1371, 1374 (1988); Gene R. Nichol Jr, Ripeness and the Constitution, 54 U Chi L Rev 153,
162–64 (1987); John A. Ferejohn and Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent
Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 NYU L Rev 962, 1009 (2002). But see
Ann Woolhandler and Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102 Mich L
Rev 689, 691 (2004) (contending that there was “an active law of standing in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries”).
237 See Camreta, 563 US at 702.
238 Id at 701.
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performs his duties.”239 But that could only be true if the ruling is
part of the Article III “Case” and entitled to deference in future
cases. After all, Article III says where there’s no “Case” (or “Controversy”), there’s no judicial power.
Second, consider the law-of-the-case doctrine. In complex
cases, federal circuit courts commonly dispose of appeals on a single ground, remand to the district court for further adjudication
on other issues, and provide guidance on the remaining legal
questions in the case. The court’s guidance will typically be
treated as the “law of the case” and thus binding on the parties.
But it is hard to see how that could be so unless the circuit court’s
guidance is part of the “Case.”
To be clear, the point isn’t that the scope of precedent must
overlap with the scope of an Article III “Case” or “Controversy.”240
The point is that the case-or-controversy requirement doesn’t proscribe federal courts from giving precedential effect to rulings on
issues that aren’t necessary for the outcome.241 Instead, Article III
allows federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over, and establish
law concerning, any issue that is part of a properly brought case
(even where the issue turns out not to have been necessary for the
outcome).
This reading is consistent with the idea that the federal judiciary is a “reactive” institution “designed to answer” only those
“questions that are posed to it.”242 Courts may not establish law
on topics that are unrelated to the cases before them. But current
justiciability doctrine ensures that they don’t. If an earlier court
didn’t have Article III jurisdiction over a claim at the time it made
its decision, then a ruling on that claim can’t be precedential. As
one judge said in the interviews, a ruling can be “binding” only if
239

Id at 702–03.
Indeed, there may be good reasons for construing the application of preclusion
doctrines more broadly than that of stare decisis. For example, the parties have had their
day in court, affording them the opportunity to present their side of an issue, whereas
future litigants, who may be bound by stare decisis, will not have had that opportunity.
241 This observation may have implications for the precedential status of decisions
where no opinion garners a majority. The controlling case regards the opinion that reaches
the outcome on the narrowest ground as the controlling opinion. See Marks v United
States, 430 US 188, 193 (1977). One way of approaching fractured decisions is to count any
statement of law that received the assent of a majority of the court as a holding. See Williams, 69 Stan L Rev at 817–19 (cited in note 3). One criticism of this view is that it appears
to conflict with the necessity model’s requirement that a holding be necessary for the outcome in the earlier case. Id at 819. But if that requirement is subject to change, then it
removes one objection to construing fractured decisions more broadly.
242 Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Constitutional Structure, 112 Nw U L Rev 789,
804 (2017).
240
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it’s “on an[ ] issue that is part of the Article III controversy.”243
But the adjudicative model has no quarrel with this limitation on
judicial lawmaking power or with the idea that the judicial power
may be exercised only over claims raised as part of a concrete dispute between adverse parties.
CONCLUSION
Courts often talk as if there is just one way to determine the
holding of a case—a holding is a proposition asserted in a decision
that was necessary to reach the outcome. But there isn’t just one
way to think about precedential scope. Several important state
courts and one federal court of appeals follow an entirely different
approach. And in light of that alternative, we should occasionally
pause to ask whether the existing rules of precedent are serving
their purposes.
This Article is a step in that direction. It offers evidence that
the choice of precedential regime really matters—that courts using one approach will tend to behave differently from courts following another. It presents a normative framework for evaluating
the choice between precedent rules in particular institutional contexts. And it develops an account of the federal judicial power in
which the authority to establish law is more than just a byproduct
of the power to resolve disputes.

243

Judge O Interview (cited in note 102).
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1: PREDICTING FOLLOW (LOGIT)
(Intercept)
post_johnson
panel_median

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

-0.80***

-0.80***

-0.79***

-0.82***

(0.17)
0.80***
(0.22)
0.31
(0.27)

(0.16)
0.79***
(0.21)
0.30
(0.27)
-0.28

(0.16)
0.79***
(0.21)
0.28
(0.28)
-0.24

(0.22)
0.80***
(0.22)
0.28
(0.27)
-0.25

-0.83***
(0.23)
0.84***
(0.23)
0.67
(0.70)
-0.26

(0.35)

(0.34)
1.62*

(0.34)
1.57

(0.79)
1.63*

(0.97)

(1.00)
0.08
(0.22)
-0.09
(0.35)
-0.21
(0.26)
0.41

(0.99)
0.08
(0.22)
-0.07
(0.36)
-0.20
(0.26)
0.39

(0.44)

(0.46)
-0.42
(0.39)
-0.22
(1.11)
0.02

previous_panel_
median
panel_median:
previous_
panel_median
criminaly
immigrationy
laboremploymenty
corporategovernancey
author_ideology
majority_ideology
previous_author_
ideology

(0.38)
-0.01

previous_majority_
ideology
Log Likelihood
-268.94
Num. Obs.
408
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

-268.58
408

-267.15
408

-266.18
408

(1.11)
-263.27
408
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APPENDIX B
TABLE 2: PREDICTING DISTINGUISH (LOGIT)
(Intercept)
post_johnson
panel_median

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

Model 4

Model 5

-1.69***

-1.70***

-1.73***

-1.64***

(0.22)
0.36
(0.28)
-0.39
(0.40)

(0.22)
0.37
(0.28)
-0.37
(0.40)
0.20

(0.23)
0.37
(0.28)
-0.37
(0.44)
0.05

(0.30)
0.38
(0.28)
-0.41
(0.43)
0.12

-1.66***
(0.31)
0.35
(0.29)
-1.79***
(0.65)
0.60

(0.43)

(0.49)
-2.45**

(0.48)
-2.57**

(1.12)
-2.57**

(1.17)

(1.18)
-0.43*
(0.25)
0.10
(0.39)
0.31
(0.21)
0.27

(1.19)
-0.45*
(0.26)
0.05
(0.38)
0.33
(0.22)
0.27

(0.53)

(0.57)
0.60
(0.50)
1.44
(1.06)
-0.45

previous_panel_
median
panel_median:
previous_
panel_median
criminaly
immigrationy
laboremploymenty
corporategovernancey
author_ideology
majority_ideology
previous_author_
ideology

(0.56)
-0.26

previous_majority_
ideology
Log Likelihood
-196.08
Num. Obs.
408
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1

-195.95
408

-193.98
408

-191.70
408

(1.58)
-187.74
408

